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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE ADOPTION OF 
INTERPRETIVE RULES AND 
POLICY STATEMENTS 
Michael Asimow*t 
The Internal Revenue Service ruled that private hospitals need not 
offer free or below-cost medical services to the poor in order to main-
tain their tax-exempt status.1 This ruling reversed the Service's prior 
position and presumably resulted in a substantial reduction in the 
availability of affordable hospital care to poor people. 2 The United 
States Parole Board adopted guidelines establishing criteria for parole 
decisions and specifying the range of months a federal prisoner must 
serve before his release from prison.3 The Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service changed its instructions to district directors concerning 
the effect of an alien's marriage on his deportation. As a result of 
the new directive, the marriage of a deportable alien to a resident alien 
would no longer be the basis for an indefinite extension of deporta-
tion. 4 
Each of these administrative rules had important and immediate 
consequences for an appreciable number of persons. The rules had a 
definite impact on access to medical care, -terms in federal prisons, 
and residency in the United States. Yet in none of these instances 
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. B.S. 1961, Uni-
versity of California at Los Angeles; LL.B. 1964, University of California at Berkeley. 
-Ed. 
t This article is based upon my report as consultant for the Committee on Rule-
making and Public Information of the Administrative Conference of the United 
States. The proposals made in this article have been accepted in substance by the 
Conference in Recommendation 76-5, quoted in note 266 infra. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Charles Hom of the Ad-
ministrative Conference staff in conducting interviews. I have benefited greatly 
from the views of Norman Abrams, Kenneth Davis, Steve Williams, Arthur Bonfield, 
and David Minge, who read the manuscript, and from the informed criticism of the 
members of the Committee on Rulemaking and Public Information. 
1. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. 
2. See Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974), revd. on other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976), discussed in text at notes 
145-57 infra. 
3. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.18-.20 (1975). See Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 
F.2d 1107, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1974), discussed in text at notes 120-32 infra. See gen-
erally Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE 
L.J. 810 (1975). 
4. See Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
824 (1976), discussed in text at notes 82-87 infra. 
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did the agency give any prior notice that it was considering a new 
rule or permit the public to comment before its adoption. This lack 
of procedure contrasts sharply with the requirements for most rule-
making under section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 
which prescribes preadoption notice to the public and an opportunity 
for interested persons to comment on the proposed rule. 
In each case, the agency's failure to involve the public in the for-
mation of its rule had a plausible basis: the exceptions in the APA's 
rule-making provision for interpretive0 rules or policy statements. 7 
Although interpretive rules of general applicability and general policy 
statements must be published in the Federal Register,8 the APA sets 
5. (a) This section applies, accordingly to the provisions thereof, except to the 
extent that there is involved-
( 1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or 
(2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public 
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts. 
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Fed-
eral Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally 
served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The no-
tice shall include-
( 1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making 
proceedings; 
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; 
and 
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description 
of the subjects and issues involved. 
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not 
apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of 
agency organization, procedure, or practice; or 
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding 
and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) that notice and 
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest. 
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested 
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of 
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presenta-
tion. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall in-
corporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and pur-
pose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after oppor-
tunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead 
of this subsection. 
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made 
not less than 30 days before its effective date, except-
( 1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or re-
lieves a restriction; 
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or 
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and pub-
lished with. the rule. 
( e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the 
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. 
5 u.s.c. § 553 (1970). 
6. Although the AP A uses the term "interpretative," the author prefers the word 
"interpretive" for stylistic reasons. For an example of a statute using the word "in-
terpretive," see Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1975). 
7. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A), (d)(2) (1970). 
8. 5 U.S.C. § .552(a) (1) (D) (1970). 
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forth no procedural formalities for their adoption.° For purposes of 
this article, an "interpretive rule" clarifies the meaning of language 
in statutes or other rules without creating legally binding rights or 
obligations, and a "policy statement" indicates how the agency will 
exercise a discretionary function. Both types of administrative pro-
nouncements ("nonlegislative rules")10 are to be contrasted with 
administratively enacted "legislative rules,"11 which prescribe rights 
or obligations binding on both 1:he agency and the public. 
Section I of this article surveys the practices of a selected group 
of federal agencies in the adoption of interpretive rules and policy 
statements. It emphasizes the importance of these rules both to mem-
bers of the public and to the administrative process. Section II ana-
lyzes the cases that have considered the AP A exemption of interpre-
tive rules and policy statements from preadoption notice and comment 
procedures. These cases are in disarray for several reasons. For one 
thing, the bright lines traditionally assumed to distinguish interpretive 
rules and policy statements from legislative rules have become blurred 
and indistinct. Moreover, the courts have become sensitive to the 
public's need to take part in the rule-making process and have in-
creasingly required procedural innovations at the agency level. As 
section II shows, two inconsistent lines of case law have emerged. In 
one group of cases, the courts have analyzed the "legal effect" of the 
rule and have deferred to the agency's own categorization of its rule. 
In the second group, the courts have concentrated on the practical 
effect of the rule and have required preadoption procedures for rules 
that have a "substantial impact" on the public. Unfortunately, the 
9. For discussion of this exemption, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE 
SEVENTIES 138-66, 193-205 (1976); Bonfield, ,Some Tentative Thoughts on Public 
Participation in the Making of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy 
Under the A.P.A., 23 AD. L. REv. 101 (1971); Javaras, Krane & Levin, Public Hear-
ings for Private Rulings: A Dissent, 50 TAXES 160 (1972); Koch, Public Procedures 
for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64 
GEO. L.J. 1047 (1976); Note, Administrative Law-The Legislative-Interpretative 
Distinction: Semantical Feinting with an Exception to Rulemaking Procedures, 54 
N.C.L. REV. 421 (1976); Comment, A Functional Approach to the Applicability of 
Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act to Agency Statements of Policy, 43 
U. CHI. L. REV. 430 (1976) (a particularly thoughtful comment); Comment, Revenue 
Rulings and the Administrative Procedure Act, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 1135. 
10. There is no doubt that both policy statements and interpretive rules are 
"rules" under the AP A. A "rule" is defined as "the whole or a part of an agency 
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to imple-
ment, interpret, or prescribe law or policy .••. " 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970) (em-
phasis added). 
11. Although the term "substantive rule" appears more frequently in judicial de-
cisions, the author prefers the term "legislative rule." The term "substantive," which 
implies a distinction from "procedural," is confusing in this context. None of the 
rules considered in this paper-interpretive rules, policy statements, or legislative 
rules-are procedural; rather, all relate to substance. 
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first group of cases fails to give sufficient attention to the public's need 
to participate in the rule-making process, while the second is difficult 
to reconcile with the APA and produces unpredictable results. Section 
III of this article returns to the problem of the distinction between 
legislative and interpretive rules and emphasizes the increasing irrele-
vance of the distinction. Finally, section IV proposes a new post-
adoption procedure for the formulation of interpretive rules of general 
applicability and general policy statements. It is hoped that these 
procedures accommodate the conflicting needs of the public to in-
fluence agency nonlegislative rulemaking and of the agency to be 
free from excessive procedural rigidity. 
I. THE ROLE OF INTERPRETIVE RULES AND 
POLICY STATEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
This section of the article summarizes the nonlegislative rule-
making practices of four representative federal agencies: the Internal 
Revenue Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Federal 
Communications Commission, and Federal Trade Commission.12 
This analysis should convey an understanding of the indispensability 
of interpretive rules and policy statements to effective administration 
and their enormous practical impact on the public. 
A. Rule-Making Practices of the Federal Agencies 
1. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
In considering the rule-making procedures of the IRS, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between "regulations" and other rules. The fa-
miliar IRS regulations13 seem to be a mixture of legislative and inter-
pretive rules, but this distinction has no procedural importance. The 
adoption of virtually all new or amended regulations on substantive 
tax matters is accompanied by prior notice and comment procedures. 
Thus, appellate courts concerned with the validity of IRS regulations 
12. Some of the material presented in this section is drawn from interviews con-
ducted at the four agencies. Interviews were also conducted with the staffs of six 
other agencies: the Food and Drug Administration, Federal Power Commission, 
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, Securities and Exchange Commission, and the United States 
Board of Parole. For a description of the rule-making practices of these agencies, 
see my consultant's report to the Committee on Rulemaking and Public Information 
of the Administrative Conference of the United States. 
The interviews covered such matters as the purposes for which interpretive rules 
and policy statements are used, the procedures used in adopting them, and the staff's 
attitude toward the desirability of additional procedures. Reference is made to these 
interviews throughout the article without citation. 
13, Treas. Reg. §§ 1.0-601.702 (1976), 
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seldom need to decide whether the regulation is legislative or inter-
pretive. 
However, the IRS adopts many other nonlegislative rules of gen-
eral applicability. For example, it issues about 700 revenue rulings 
each year, 14 which typically apply tax statutes, regulations, or prior 
rulings to particular facts. These rulings, published in the Cumula-
tive Bulletin, are adopted without prior notice or opportunity for 
public comment and bind the IRS as a matter of policy.15 Although 
many rulings seem fairly trivial, others unquestionably have great 
public impact and most have significance for at least a few taxpayers. 
For example, the ruling mentioned at the beginning of this article, 16 
which established that tax-exempt private hospitals need not give free 
or below-cost service to the poor, had a great impact on health care 
delivery. Other particularly important revenue rulings announced the 
Service's position on ,the deductibility of prepaid interest17 and of 
expenditures for cattle feed, 18 and eliminated the popular educa-
tional benefit trust device.19 
The Service also issues about fifty revenue procedures annually. 
These appear to be policy statements, since they indicate how the IRS 
intends to exercise its discretion. For example, a revenue procedure 
is often used to indicate the circumstances in which the Service will 
give a favorable private ruling. 20 Since such private rulings are 
virtually indispensable for certain kinds of transactions, the revenue 
procedure as a practical matter establishes law. The recent revenue 
procedures that set ground rules for the use of limited partnerships 
as tax shelters21 are prime examples of policy statements that have 
a large practical impact on private affairs. Finally, the IRS Manual 
contains interpretive rules and policy statements along with many 
procedural instructions to the Service's staff.22 
The interpretive rules and policy sfatements adopted by the IRS 
14. See generally Comment, 1975 Wis. L. R.Ev. 1135, supra note 9. 
15. Rev. Proc. 72-1, §§ 6.013-.015, 1972-1 C.B. 694-95. See generally Rogovin, 
The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, Retroactivity, 43 TAXES 756 (1956). 
16. See text at notes 1-2 supra & notes 145-57 infra and accompanying text. 
17. See Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 C.B. 76; Andrew Sandor, 62 T.C. 469 (1974), 
affd. per curiam, 536 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1976). 
18. Rev. Ru!. 73-530, reissued as Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C. B. 144. See Cattle 
Feeders Tax Comm. v. Shultz, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,067 (W.D. Okla.), revd. on 
other grounds, 504 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974). 
19. See Rev. Ru!. 75-448, 1975-2 C.B. 55. 
20. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 74-26, 1974-2 C.B. 478. 
21. See Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438; Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735. 
22. See UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 
§ 4562.2 (1975) (reasonable cause for filing of returns). 
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benefit both taxpayers and the agency. They guide IRS personnel 
in applying the law uniformly to taxpayers all over the country. In 
addition, by clarifying the law, they reduce the number of inquiries 
from taxpayers to which the IRS must respond. Finally, they con-
serve scarce IRS resources by deterring the very kinds of transactions 
that would most likely be audited and that would probably lead to 
litigation. 
2. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
Like the IRS, the INS utilizes preadoption notice and comment 
procedures when it adds to or alters both legislative and interpretive 
rules published in the Code of Federal Regulations. But it also 
makes extensive use of policy statements and interpretive rules by 
issuing annually hundreds of operating instructions to staff. 23 The 
INS has been gradually increasing the number of its rules that are 
exposed to prior public comment, 24 but most of the staff instructions 
are adopted without any public input. 
The validity of adopting policy statements and interpretations 
concerning immigration matters without prior public notice and com-
ment has been frequently litigated. In each case, the rule appears 
to have had a drastic impact on the affairs of significant numbers of 
people. One case, referred to at the beginning of this article, 2t1 in-
volved an INS "operations instruction" concerning the effect of mar-
riage on deportation. Another was a Labor Department field memo-
randum relating to live-in maids. 26 A third involved a Labor De-
partment directive that revoked a convenient precer.tification proce-
dure for aliens seeking visas to work in the United States. 27 And 
a fourth involved an INS rule affecting the exclusion of alien students 
from the labor certification provisions. 28 Finally, an operations in-
struction setting forth criteria for voluntary departure and indefinite 
23. The Labor Department also issues many instructions and interpretations to 
guide the INS in administering the provisions relating to labor certification of aliens. 
They are generally adopted without any prior notice or comment procedures. 
24. The INS personnel interviewed said that the input from the public was often 
quite helpful to the agency. 
25. See Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975), discussed in text at 
note 4 supra & notes 82-87 infra and accompanying text; Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 
389 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.J. 1975); Dimaren v. INS, 398 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
26. See Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1975). 
27. See Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed 
in text at notes 114-19, infra. 
28. See Hou Ching Chow v. Attorney General, 362 F. Supp. 1288 (D,D.C, 
1973). 
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extensions of voluntary departure29 has had great practical impor-
tance in day-to-day deportation proceedings. 
3. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
While the FCC has long made extensive use of policy state-
ments, it has been inconsistent in inviting public participation. 30 
Among the many such FCC pronouncements that have had a dra-
matic effect on the interests of both licensees and the public are the 
chain broadcasting report held ripe for review by the Supreme Court 
in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States;31 a 1965 
statement on the criteria for selecting among applicants for a license 
in a comparative hearing,32 and a 1970 statement prescribing license 
renewal criteria. 33 Other policy statements used by -the FCC are more 
innocuous; they may simply be reminders to the industry of new stat-
utes or well-established and noncontroversial points. 34 
FCC staff members claim that policy statements have been used 
because the policies lacked sufficient definitiveness to be expressed 
in legislative rules. They deny that the FCC uses the policy statement 
label to avoid the requirement of public participation or to facilitate 
subsequent deviations from the statement.35 Sometimes, however, as 
in the case of the so-called personal attack rules, 36 legislative rules 
are employed to announce new policy so that the sanction of statutory 
forfeiture procedures can be invoked for violation of the rules.37 
29. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS§ 242.10. 
30. For examples of policy statements in which public comments were solicited, 
see 40 Fed. Reg. 25,689 (1975) (concerning agreements between broadcast licensees 
and the public); 39 Fed. Reg. 39,395 (1974) (concerning children's television pro-
grams); 39 Fed. Reg. 26,371 (1974) (concerning the fairness doctrine and public 
interest standards). 
31. 316 U.S. 407 (1942). 
32. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965). 
33. 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970). See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 
F.2d 1201, 1204 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which suggests in dictum that adoption of 
this policy statement without public participation might have been invalid. 
34. Cf. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 914 (1973), involving the FCC's warning to licensees that they should 
screen recorded music for lyrics that encourage drug use. 31 F.C.C.2d 377 (1971). 
The court felt that the FCC was simply reminding licensees of an already existing 
duty. 
35. Professor Tomlinson suggests that one recent FCC decision was in the form 
of a policy statement rather than a legislative rule so that it could be retroactive. See 
E. Tomlinson, Final Report in Support of Recommendation on Strengthening the In-
formational and Notice Giving Functions of the Federal Register 33 n.80 (Dec. 31, 
1975) (unpublished report for Administrative Conference of the United States). 
36. See 41 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1976). These rules were upheld in Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
37. See 41 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1970); 18 F.C.C. 2d 240 (1969) (FCC's statement 
on employment nondiscrimination rules). 
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4. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
In addition to its legislative trade regulation rules, the FTC issues 
a substantial number of interpretive rules in the form of industry 
guides. 38 These designate conduct that the FTC believes is unfair or 
deceptive; they typically have a substantial impact on commercial 
practices, since businesspersons in the affected industries generally 
conform to them. The staff puts comparatively little effort into the 
drafting of interpretive rules, which tend to be relatively vague and 
comprehensive, unlike legislative rules, which are tightly drawn, very 
specific, and cover relatively few points. Since 1958, the FTC has 
adopted industry guides only after giving public notice and inviting 
comments, 39 and interviews with the agency staff indicated that the 
comments received were frequently quite helpful. 
The new FTC statute clearly distinguishes interpretive and legis-
lative rules. 40 Violation of legislative rules gives rise to liability for 
steep civil penalties as well as to broad liabilities to the public, 41 
but violation of interpretive rules cannot automatically trigger such 
liabilities.42 In FTC adjudication, interpretive and legislative rules 
are sharply differentiated: If a person has violated an interpretive rule, 
the FTC proceeds under the statute, using the rule as a likely but 
not a necessary interpretation; but if the respondent has violated a 
legislative rule, the FTC proceeds under the rule.43 Thus, adjudi-
cation under a legislative rule is considerably less complex than under 
an interpretive rule, since the agency must determine the meaning of 
the statute in the latter case. However, in such a case, the agency 
is almost certain to give great weight to its previously promulgated 
interpretive rule; it is doubtful therefore that the results of applying 
legislative and interpretive rules will often differ. 
B. The Interests of Agencies and the Public in 
Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements 
The preceding discussion of the practices of four agencies illus-
38. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 256 (1976) (guides for lawbook industry). 
39. However, the FTC does not invite public comments before issuing its occas-
ional enforcement policy statements, which indicate enforcement priorities for the 
staff. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 14.9 (1976) (foreign language advertising); 36 Fed. 
Reg. 12,058 (1971) (substantiation of advertising claims). 
40. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 18(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. V. 
1975), which distinguishes interpretive rules and policy statements from legislative 
rules. The elaborate procedures prescribed for the adoption of legislative rules are 
more detailed than those generally required by the AP A. 
41. Federal Trade Commission Act§ 5(m), 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (Supp. V. 1975). 
42. Interpretive rules are explicitly exempted from these provisions. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(m)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1975). 
43. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (1976). 
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trates several fundamental points. First, interpretive rules and policy 
statements are of great importance to the public in alerting them to 
the agency's position on substantive matters. They frequently have 
a substantial impact on the affairs of large segments of the public be-
cause they definitively affect the behavior of agencies and interested 
persons or groups. In this respect they differ little from legislative 
rules. 
Second, interpretive rules and policy statements are indispensable 
to proper administration. Agencies cannot perform effectively unless 
they clarify the law through interpretive rules and channel their dis-
cretion through policy statements. Both kinds of rulemaking are 
needed to guide the staff in administering the statute and in assisting 
regulated persons to comply with the law.44 
Third, a number of agencies now make it their practice to provide 
notice and comment procedures for many or even most of their gen-
erally applicable interpretive rules and policy statements. 45 This 
practice has become prevalent at some agencies, appears occasionally 
in others, and is unknown in still others. The trend toward the vol-
untary use of public participation has been influenced by several con-
siderations. In response to recent cases requiring public participation 
in the formulation of interpretive rules and policy statements that have 
a "substantial impact,"46 personnel at some agencies have decided 
that the costs of notice and comment procedures are preferable to the 
uncertainties of litigation. Personnel at other agencies are genuinely 
convinced of the value of public participation. They believe it pro-
duces better rules, increases judicial deference, and enhances the ac-
ceptability of the rules to the public. Still, the voluntary use of pre-
adoption procedures is spotty. Unless there is either additional clarifi-
cation by the courts of the ap2licable definitional standard or congres-
sional revision of the APA, many agencies will continue to make 
interpretive rules and policy statements without any public partici-
pation at all. 
Finally, the interviews at many agencies suggest that agency per-
sonnel almost unanimously oppose any statute that would require the 
standard preadoption notice and comment procedures for most or all 
interpretive rules and policy statements. The staffs repeatedly 
stressed that, if followed in good faith, such procedures would seri-
44. See generally E. Tomlinson, supra note 35, at 32-57. 
45. For a discussion of the practices of the FCC and the FTC, see text at notes 
30-43 supra. The Food and Drug Administration, Federal Power Commission, and 
Securities and Exchange Commission also frequently utilize notice and comment pro-
cedures in connection with nonlegislative rulemaking. 
46. See notes 108-57 infra and accompanying text. 
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ously delay rulemaking and increase agency costs. Often the public 
would have nothing useful to contribute, yet a proposed rule could 
be delayed for many months, during which time uncertainty and 
confusion would exist. Interviewed agency personnel cautioned 
that the extra burdens of preadoption procedures would deter the pro-
mulgation of interpretive rules and policy statements and would force 
the agency to find alternative ways to achieve the same result. 
This consensus should counsel caution in espousing a repeal of 
the present AP A exemption for policy statements and interpretive 
rules. Nevertheless, the present statute excludes the interested and 
affected public from participation in the formulation of interpretations 
and policy, except when the agency voluntarily provides notice and 
comment procedures or a court intervenes. Therefore, a method 
must be devised that reconciles the justifiable claims of the agencies 
and the public whom they serve. After analyzing the confused case 
law in this area, this article will propose a system for postadop-
tion public commentary that offers prospects of reconciling these de-
mands. 
II. JUDICIAL TESTS USED To DISTINGUISH 
LEGISLATIVE AND NONLEGISLATIVE RULES 
Under the AP A, legislative and nonlegislative rules must be 
sharply distinguished, since the Act requires full-fledged notice and 
comment procedures prior to the adoption of legislative rules but 
imposes no such requirements upon the adoption of nonlegislative 
rules. 47 Yet the AP A fails to define interpretive rules or policy state-
ments, and, as a practical matter, it is often difficult to distinguish them 
from legislative rules except by recourse to the agency's label. For 
example, the FCC adopted a "policy statement" to prescribe the stand-
ard of service that a broadcaster must meet in order to have its license 
renewed48 but adopted a "legislative rule" -to prescribe the equal 
employment obligations of licensees. 49 Both pronouncements lim-
ited the FCC's discretion to decide what is in the public interest and 
both had a substantial practical impact upon broadcasters, yet the 
public was invited to participate only in the formulation of the legis-
lative rule. 
In recent years, members of the public have claimed that they 
were entitled to notice and comment before the adoption of a rule 
47. However, there is no distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules 
of general applicability on one important point; all must be published in the Federal 
Register. S U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)(D) (1970). 
48. See 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970). 
49. See 18 F.C.C.2d 240 (1969). 
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labelled by the agency as an interpretive rule or a policy statement. 
Courts responding to these claims have adopted one of two incon-
sistent lines of analysis. According to one line of cases, a rule is 
classified as legislative or nonlegislative on the basis of whether it 
alters the legal rights or obligations of members of the public. The 
courts in these cases generally defer to the agency's own categorization 
of the rule. The standard developed in these cases will be referred 
to in this article as the "legal effect" test. Courts in the second line 
of cases pay far less attention to the agency's label or to the legal 
effect of the rule; instead they decide whether the public was en-
titled to participate by weighing the public's need to do so. The 
standard used in these cases will be referred to herein as the "sub-
stantial impact" test. 
A. The Legal Effect Standard 
The legal effect test is based on the proposition that there exists 
a fundamental difference in the legal consequences of legislative and 
nonlegislative agency action. According to this test, legislative rules 
alter the rights and obligations of members of -the public without 
further action by the agency. Nonlegislative rules, on the other hand, 
simply describe how the agency intends in the future to interpret law 
or exercise discretion. Even though nonlegislative rules may have 
drastic, self-executing effects on behavior, they nevertheless are not 
"the law." Of course, the most obvious way to ascertain whether a 
rule affects the public's rights and obligations is to determine how 
the agency describes its rule; thus the courts rely heavily on the 
agency's label. But the courts have also been guided by tests sug-
gested by the reports of governmental committees, the legislative 
history of the APA, and commentators. For purposes of discussion, 
this section will treat separately the development of the legal effect 
standard in cases involving policy statements and interpretive rules. 
1. Policy Statements 
A recent Second Circuit decision remarked that the distinction 
between policy statements and legislative rules had become "en-
shrouded in considerable smog."50 In a similar vein, the District 
of Columbia Circuit thought the distinction was a "fuzzy prod-
uct. "51 No one who reads the cases that have wrestled with this 
50. Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
824 (1976). 
51. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1974), quoting 
1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 5.01, at 290 (1958). See Shapiro, 
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problem would disagree with these characterizations. Although the 
complaints are contemporary, the smog and fuzziness have been 
present from the outset, for it has never been possible clearly to dis-
tinguish policy statements from legislative rules. 
a. Tests suggested by committees and commentators. One early 
standard under which the two types of rules might be distin-
guished 52 was offered in the seminal report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee on Administrative Procedure. Recommending that 
general policy statements be published in the Federal Register, the 
Committee described them this way: 
Most agencies develop approaches ,to particular types of problems, 
which as they become established, are generally determinative of de-
cisions. . . . As soon as the "policies" of an agency become suf-
ficiently articulated to serve as real guides to agency officials in their 
treatment of concrete problems, that fact may advantageously be 
brought to public attention by publication in a precise and regular-
ized form. 53 
This description is a helpful first effort, but it seems contradictory. 
What did the Committee mean by "approac]Jes" to problems? If it 
meant that a policy statement is tentative, rather than definitive, the 
distinction may be workable. Yet confusion arises from the re-
mainder of the Committee's description, which requires that the policy 
be "sufficiently articulated to serve as a real guide to agency officials 
. . . ." If the policy has reached that stage of concreteness, then there 
may be little to distinguish it from a legislative rule that also guides 
agency officials and the public. 54 
The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative 
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 930 (1965). 
52. For an interesting early case on a policy statement, see Standard Computing 
Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571 (1919). State statutes provided for both a state 
superintendent and local inspectors of weights and measures. After an investigation, 
the state superintendent published a "bulletin" in which he said that scales "must" 
be equipped with a device to compensate for temperature changes, Local inspectors 
followed the bulletin and refused to "seal" plaintiffs scale, which lacked this device, 
The Supreme Court held that the "bulletin" was not a "rule" and thus not subject to 
any constitutional attack. It declared that the opinions and advice of those in author-
ity are not a law or a regulation. 
53. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRA· 
TIVE PROCEDURE 26-27 (1941) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S CoMMITTEE REPORT]. 
54. The discussion of the dissenting members of the Committee is even less help-
ful. They proposed that an agency be compelled by statute to formulate and publish 
a number of items including statements of policy: ''Where an agency acting under 
general or specific legislation, has formulated or acts upon general policies not clearly 
specified in legislation, so far as practicable such policies shall be formulated, stated, 
published, and revised in the same manner as other rules." Id. at 225. This lan-
guage was incorporated in the publication requirements of the legislation introduced 
to implement the Committee's report. See S.614, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(a), 87 
CONG. REC, 333 (1941); S.918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(b), 87 CONG, REC, 11S0 
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The legislative history of the AP A provides little guidance for de-
veloping a standard for defining policy statements, although it does 
provide a clear statement of the rationale for the statutory exemption 
for nonlegislative rules.55 Presumably, the APA draftsmen were 
guided by the rather vague description of policy statements in the At-
torney General's Committee report.56 
The Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure 
Act51 noted that general statements of policy are "statements issued 
by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in 
which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power."58 
This definition is moderately useful. It uses the word "proposes," 
which again suggests that a policy statement is tentative rather than 
definitive. It emphasizes that a policy statement relates to a discre-
tionary power, whereas an interpretive rule construes statutes or rules. 
Nevertheless, the definition tells little about how to distinguish 
policy statements from those legislative rules that also address discre-
tionary functions. 
Several commentators have proposed tests for identifying policy 
statements and distinguishing them from legislative rules. Professor 
Bonfield, for example, has suggested that policy statements are those 
rules addressed to the staff of the agency rather than to members of 
the public. 59 Professor Davis, in contrast, argued that the rules 
should be distinguished largely by reference to the label chosen by 
the agency.60 In a recent study for the Administrative Conference 
of the United States, Professor Tomlinson suggested that policy state-
ments are temporary measures designed to be replaced relatively 
quickly by more definitive legislative rules. 61 Drawing upon a 
number of recent cases, still another commentator suggested that, to 
(1941), quoted in Administrative Procedure: Hearings on S.674, S.675, and S.918 
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on tlze Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 
(1941) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. 
55. See S. Doc. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 1946, at 18 (1947) [hereinafter 
cited as APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY], quoted in note 261 infra. 
56. See note 53 supra. 
57. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON TiiE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
(1947). The Manual was written in 1947, one year after the passage of the APA, 
to explain its purpose and effect to administrative officials. 
58. Id. at 30 n.3 (emphasis added). The District of Columbia Circuit accorded 
this definition "considerable weight because of the very active role the Attorney 
General played in the formulation and enactment of the APA." Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
59. See Bonfield, supra note 9, at 115. 
60. K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 148. 
61. See E. Tomlinson, supra note 35, at 50. For a similar view, see K. DAVIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 102 (1969). 
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determine which rules concerning discretionary functions should be 
considered legislative rules, courts must analyze the substantiality of 
a rule's effect on the public, the extent to which the public would 
have a subsequent opportunity to influence the agency, the extent to 
which public comment would help the agency, and considerations of 
agency efficiency. 62 
b. Judicial definitions. The first significant case to address the 
problem of identifying policy statements was Airport Commission 
of Forsyth County v. CAB,63 which involved the requirement that 
general policy statements be published in the Federal Register. The 
Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Aviation Administration 
jointly issued a press release setting forth a new policy concern-
ing the centralization of airline routes into a single airport serving 
several cities. However, the press release was not published in the 
Federal Register, seemingly a clear-cut violation of section 3 of 
the AP A. 64 In an unpersuasive opinion, the Fourth Circuit held 
that publication was not required, observing that the press release did 
not set forth a rule that the public was required to obey or with which 
it -had to avoid conflict. This test proved helpful to later courts 
seeking to distinguish policy statements from legislative rules through 
analysis of the legal effect of the rule. 
A panel of the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the Forsyth 
County analysis in the important 1974 case of Pacific Gas & Electric 
Co. v. FPC.65 The FPC required pipeline companies to file plans 
establishing priorities during periods in which gas deliveries were to 
be curtailed. The submitted plans reflected a wide range of views 
on whether curtailments should occur according to the relative effi-
ciencies of the end use of the gas or according to prior contractual 
commitments. Consequently, the FPC issued Order 467, which it 
-called a policy statement, explaining that curtailments should occur 
according to a detailed priority list based on the efficiency of the end 
use of the gas. There was no public participation in the formulation 
of Order 467, and the court held that none was required. 66 
62. See Comment, 43 U. CHI. L, REV, 430, supra note 9. 
63. 300 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1962). 
64. Section 3(a)(3) of the APA explicitly required publication of "statements of 
general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by 
the agency for the guidance of the public." Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 
§ 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946). Although the language is different, the requirements of 
the current version of the statute are the same. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (D) (1970), 
See E. Tomlinson, supra note 35, at 47-48. 
65. 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Accord, Pacific Lighting Serv. Co. v. FPC, 
518 F.2d 718 (1975). 
66. -See 506 F,2d at 38. 
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In reaching its decision, the court first spoke of the appropriate 
role of policy statements in the administrative process. Policy state-
ments, it observed, are anterior to both rulemaking and adjudication; 
like press releases, they announce policy the agency hopes to imple-
ment in future rulemaking or adjudication. The publication of policy 
statements permits public dissemination of the agency's policies prior 
to actual application in particular situations and facilitates long-range 
planning within the affected industry. 
Turning to the problem of characterizing the rule, the court relied 
on the Forsyth County test. It noted that a policy statement does 
not establish a binding norm or make a final determination of any 
issues or rights. The agency cannot apply or rely upon it as law and 
must be prepared to support the policy when it is applied as if the 
statement had never been issued. 67 Applying these principles, the 
court determined that Order 467 had no final, inflexible impact upon 
the petitioners. Deferring to the agency's characterization and 
description of its action, the court noted that it had been consistently 
described as a policy statement. The court also found it significant 
that the order expressly envisaged future proceedings. It emphasized 
as well the right of interested parties in subsequent adjudications to 
challenge or support the policy through factual or legal presenta-
tions. 68 The FPC declared that the order prescribed only initial 
guidelines as a means of facilitating curtailment planning and the ad-
judication of cases. Indeed, the court went out of its way to establish 
that Order 467 would not even shift the burden of proof in subse-
quent curtailment cases and that the burden would remain on the 
pipeline company.69 
The decision reached in Pacific Gas & Electric seems correct if 
the standard for analysis is the legal effect of the policy statement. 
Application of the factors suggested by the Attorney General's Com-
mittee report, prior cases, and commentators seems to suggest, on the 
whole, the same result reached by the court: 
67. See 506 F.2d at 38. 
68. See 506 F.2d at 40-41. 
69. See 506 F.2d at 43. The court could easily have held that Order 467 shifted 
the burden of proof in subsequent proceedings to customers. Transwestem Pipeline 
Co., 50 F.P.C. 343 (1973), affd. sub nom. Pacific Lighting Serv. v. FPC, 518 F.2d 
718 (9th Cir. 1975), involved customers who protested the priority system generally 
as well as the specific curtailment priorities. The FPC refused to order a hear-
ing under section 4 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970), which would have 
given the pipeline company the burden of proving the reasonableness of its plan, and 
instead ordered a hearing under section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1970), which gave the 
challengers the burden of proof. 50 F.P.C. at 344. Thus, Transwestern could easily 
be read to indicate that Order 467 shifted the burden of proof and that the FPC had 
little interest in any prompt reconsideration of the matter. But the Paci/ ic Gas & 
Electric court brushed Transwestern aside. See 506 F.2d at 43 n.28. 
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( 1) the order did not set forth a rule that the public must 
obey; 
(2) the FPC had consistently labelled the order as a policy 
statement; 
(3) the order used many tentative words, which suggests it 
was a policy statement, although it was not clear whether the order 
was permanent or temporary;70 
( 4) it was not clear whether the statement was directed at the 
FPC staff or at the public; and 
( 5) aggrieved persons would have subsequent administrative 
proceedings in which they could seek to change the agency's policy.71 
The discussion in Pacific Gas & Electric on the practical effect 
of Order 467 is disappointingly thin. The court alluded to Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States,72 in which a policy 
statement drastically impaired a network's contracts and organization, 
but said the "effect of Order 467 in the present case is not so direct or 
immediate"73 because there was no present abrogation of contractual 
commitments. Such commitments would be affected only after actual 
curtailment plans were filed and approved by the FPC, and even then 
"[t]he possibility that petitioners might receive a lower curtailment 
priority at some future time as the result of a subsequent tariff filing 
does not compare with the significant and immediate impact of the 
regulations in Columbia Broadcasting."74 
Admittedly, the effect of Order 467 was not as drastic as that of 
the policy statement in Columbia Broadcasting. But surely the 
impact of a policy statement should not have to reach that level of 
severity before adversely affected parties are given the right to pre-
adoption participation. Order 467 had an immediate effect on all 
gas customers who had contractual commitments for deliveries, but 
low priorities, and who had every reason to take the FPC's pro-
nouncement seriously. The chance of obtaining a waiver in subse-
quent proceedings would have appeared to them to be extremely 
slight.75 Consequently, low priority customers had to begin an im-
70. These tests are suggested by Professors Bonfield and Tomlinson. See text at 
notes 59-61 supra. 
71. !See text at note 62 supra. 
72. 316 U.S. 407 (1942). 
73. 506 F.2d at 42. 
74. 506 F.2d at 42. 
75. A subsequent case, Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 512 F.2d 1332 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975), noted in 17 B.C. !Nous. & CoM. L. REV. 260 (1976), revealed that Order 
467 would have an immediate effect. Both customers and pipeline companies who 
wished to continue interim plans that did not comply with Order 467 were summarily 
rejected by the FPC; thus, it was clear that filings in compliance with Order 467 
would be accepted and all others would be suspended. 
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mediate search for alternative energy sources, to negotiate long-range 
commitments for other fuels, and to purchase equipment for burning 
them. All this might well impair profits and affect a vast range of 
investment decisions. Moreover, authoritative guidance from the FPC 
was absolutely imperative for the pipeline companies, since FPC 
approval of a plan abrogating existing contracts might be a defense 
to contractual liability in state courts. 
The court also held that it had no jurisdiction to review Order 
467 substantively70 since the Order was not ripe for review under 
the two criteria set forth in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.17 First, 
it had no immediate and significant impact on petitioners because 
it was tentative. There was no assurance that the Order would, 
in fact, be imposed on each customer and pipeline, and thus any at-
tending hardships seemed remote. Second, the issues were not 
then deemed suitable for judicial review because there was no mean-
ingful record. The contracts that were to be abrogated, for example, 
were not in the record. The court's analysis of the ripeness ques-
tion is unsatisfactory. The fact that Order 467 did not have a 
binding legal impact on petitioners should not have been the sole 
criterion on the hardship issue. In several -cases, practical business 
harm, together with reasonable assurances that the policy would not 
be reconsidered, has been considered a sufficient hardship. 78 The 
lack of a record is a far more serious objection; indeed, the court 
would have had considerable difficulty reviewing Order 467 since the 
FPC's basis for adopting it was never disclosed. 79 There was neither 
public comment, nor a statement of basis and purpose, nor any of 
the usual helpful material used in reviewing rulemaking. 80 
Pacific Gas & Electric clearly shows the inadequacy of 1:he present 
statute and the legal effect test. Order 467 cried out for public parti-
cipation, since great economic issues turned on it, and, as a practical 
matter, it was definitive. For that same reason, moreover, immediate 
76. Jurisdiction depended upon a statute that allowed review to "any party to a 
proceeding [who is] aggrieved by an order· .... " 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970). 
Although the petitioners were considered "parties to a proceeding," Order 467 was 
held not to be an "order" under the statute. The court conceded that "order'' 
includes both rules and adjudicative orders, and concluded that the standards 
for identifying an "order" should be the same as those used fo~ deciding ripeness. 
506 F.2d at 46-48. 
77. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
78. See, e.g., National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 
689 (D.C. Cir. 1971); text at notes 219-29 infra. 
19. See 17 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 260, supra note 75, at 280 & n.216. 
80. For a discussion of the standards applied in judicial review of rulemaking, 
see Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974). 
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judicial review should have been available, yet the absence of a record 
made it infeasible. 81 
In 1975, a panel of the Second Circuit applied the legal effect 
test in Noel v. Chapman.82 Noel was an alien residing in New York 
whose deportation had been ordered. He applied for and received 
the privilege of voluntary departure but failed to leave. He then mar-
ried a resident alien and applied for an indefinite extension of vol-
untary departure. The effect of his marriage was to exempt him from 
the requirement of labor certification, but not to give him a preference 
over other Western Hemisphere aliens seeking visas. In essence, the 
indefinite extension he sought would have allowed him to remain with 
his wife until a visa became available. 
Voluntary departure can be granted to a deportable alien at the 
discretion of the Attorney General. 83 By regulation, this authority 
is lodged within the sole discretion of the various district directors of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).84 Between 1968 
and 1972, these directors followed markedly different policies in 
granting indefinite extensions to deportable aliens who had married 
resident aliens; the New York director had been particularly gen-
erous. Because of the adverse impact of indefinite extensions on 
the labor market, congressional pressure was exerted on the INS 
to be stricter about granting them. Consequently, the INS instructed 
all district directors that, as of July 31, 1972, such aliens should not 
routinely be granted extensions and that relief should be afforded only 
where warranted by compelling circumstances. On April 10, 1973, 
the instruction was amended in part so that the former New York 
policy would be applied nationwide. Unfortunately for Noel, how-
ever, the revised instruction applied only to marriages occurring 
81. The Pacific Gas & Electric court made a dubious but intriguing observation 
related to the scope of judicial review of policy statements. The court pointed to 
the great deference accorded legislative rules by reviewing courts, and explained that 
this was the result of the public's role in formulating them. For discussion of the 
scope of judicial review accorded legislative rules, see text at notes 192-207 infra. 
But a policy statement adopted without public participation is fundamentally differ-
ent, and its underlying wisdom may be reassessed by the reviewing court. See 506 
F.2d at 40. This suggests that if a policy statement were adopted with public partici-
pation, the scope of its judicial review would be sharply narrowed. This dictum 
seems erroneous. If the agency has made a nonlegislative rule, plenary judicial re-
view is appropriate, regardless of the procedural formalities attending its formulation. 
A narrow scope of review is appropriate only when the agency is exercising delegated 
legislative power. However, the degree to which the public participated could appro• 
priately be considered by the court as one factor in deciding what deference it should 
pay to the agency's expertise. See text at notes 214-15 infra. 
82. 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1976). 
83. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1970). 
84. See 8 C.F.R. § 244.2 (1975). 
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before April 10, 1973. Noel's marriage occurred three days too 
late, so he was not within the scope of the amendment. 
Noel sought to have the instructions declared a legislative rule and 
therefore invalid for want of preadoption public notice and comment. 
Remarking that the distinction between policy statements and legis-
lative rules was "enshrouded in considerable smog," the court agreed 
with the INS that they were policy statements, primarily because they 
imposed no obligation on the public. 85 The court was influenced 
by Professor Bonfield's view that policy statements are typically di-
rected at the agency staff rather than at the public. If the criteria 
for assessing the legal effect of the rule are considered, however, it 
is unclear whether the court reached the correct result, since the cri-
teria point in opposite directions: 
( 1) the INS instructions did not set forth a standard that the 
public had to obey, which suggests they amounted to a policy state-
ment; 
(2) the label given to the instructions was consistent with 
treating them as a policy statement; 
(3) there was nothing tentative about the instructions, and 
they seemed permanent rather than temporary, which suggests they 
were a legislative rule; 
( 4) the instructions were directed at the staff, not the public, 
which suggests they were a policy statement; and 
( 5) aggrieved persons would have no opportunity to change 
the view of the personnel who were responsible for making the depor-
tation decision because the instructions definitively forebade the 
staff from granting automatic extensions-a characteristic sugges-
tive of a legislative rule. 
The court recognized that several other courts had required public 
participation in the formulation of rules that have a "substantial im-
pact." But it declared that there could be no substantial impact with-
out a change in "existing rights or obligations," which it found lacking 
in the case before it.86 As we shall see, however, the substantial im-
pact cases do not require a change in legal rights or obligations. On 
the contrary, they tum on the presence of substantial practical impact. 
Even if the Noel court were correct in its reading of the substantial 
impact cases, however, the INS instructions seem to have had an effect 
on the legal rights of individuals like Noel. To be sure, no alien ever 
had a legal right to require the district director to exercise discretion 
favorably to him. Yet the established practice in New York where 
85. 508 F.2d at 1030. 
86. 508 F.2d at 1030. 
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Noel lived had been routinely to grant indefinite extensions of depor-
tation to married aliens. Before the agency terminated this practice 
for deportable aliens married after a certain date, marriage meant an 
indefinite extension, whereas afterwards marriage no longer sufficed. 
A valuable status initially created by administrative action had now 
been destroyed, in a manner and with an effect that surely resembles a 
change in legal rights. Moreover, unlike the persons adversely af-
fected by the rules in Forsyth County and Pacific Gas & Electric, 
aliens such as Noel had no effective opportunity to protest the auto-
matic application of INS policy in their cases. It would, therefore, 
have been wholly defensible for the court to have labelled the INS 
instructions a legislative rule even under the traditionally defined legal 
effect test. 87 
2. Interpretive Rules 
Interpretation is a vital administrative function that consists of 
clarifying the meaning of statutes, prior regulations, case law, or other 
87. If the definition of the phrase "general applicability and legal effect" provided 
in the regulation relating to the Federal Register Act were applied, the instructions 
in Noel might be considered to have had "legal effect." The phrase is defined as 
"any document issued under proper authority prescribing a penalty or course of con-
duct, conferring a right, privilege, authority, or immunity, or imposing an obligation, 
and relevant or applicable to the general public, members of a class, or persons in 
a locality, as distinguished from named individuals or organization." 1 C.F.R. § 1.1 
(1975) (emphasis added). If the word "withdrawing" were substituted for "con-
ferring," it would appear that the instructions in Noel indeed had "legal effect." By 
definitively altering the way in which a discretionary power could be exercised, the 
INS seems to have withdrawn a "privilege" or an "immunity." 
It is also of some interest that the INS personnel interviewed thought that the 
instruction in Noel had a substantial practical impact on a significant class of aliens. 
This conclusion was shared by immigration lawyers who favor public participation 
in the making of INS instructions. Whether public participation would have served 
a useful purpose in the Noel situation, however, is uncertain. See Comment, 43 
U. CHI. L. REV. 430, supra note 9, at 451-53 (a useful analysis of situations in 
which public participation is likely to produce helpful information for the agency), 
It is not clear, for example, how much the INS would have benefited from pub-
lic exposure of the issues underlying the rule, such as the bona fides of marriages 
of deportable aliens, the impact of departure extensions on the labor markets, and 
the duration of the wait for visas. Certainly it is arguable that public debate would 
have been useful because the INS instruction had been the product of political con-
cern over the competition for jobs between citizens and aliens that had been aggra-
vated by a tight labor market. Compare Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (oral argument required in rulemaking because of suspicion that 
agency favored domestic over foreign producers), with Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
FPC, 512 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (FPC's procedure that screened out public 
acceptable because its action apparently not favorable to regulated industry), 
Other cases involving policy statements in which the legal effect test apparently 
was applied are Hunter v. Morton, 529 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1976) (alternative 
ground); Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 914 (1973); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. FPC, 462 F.2d 853 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 941 (1972), revd. on other grounds, 411 U.S. 458 
(1973) (semble); Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.J. 1975); 
Dirnaren v. INS, 398 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
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law-declaratory material. 88 One important interpretive technique is 
the adoption by an agency of interpretive rules of general applica-
bility. Interpretation also frequently occurs in the course of adjudi-
cation and through legislative rulemaking, as well as in less formal 
communications such as press releases, internal memoranda, or advice 
letters to members of the public. 89 
Consciousness of the difference between legislative and interpre-
tive rules began to appear in the literature in the late 1920s.90 Early 
administrative law writers had no difficulty making the distinction. 
Legislative rules were deemed to be those promulgated pursuant to 
a specific statutory delegation of rule-making power. For example, 
a statute might prohibit a certain action, if so provided in rules, or 
it might permit such action, except as provided in administratively 
enacted rules. Rules that were not based on a specific statutory dele-
gation of power were considered interpretive. 91 
The writers of the 1941 report of the Attorney General's Com-
mittee on Administrative Procedure shared this understanding. 92 
88. See generally M. AsIMOW, .ADVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM FEDERAL ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE AGENCIES 80-82 (1973). 
89. Interpretation can also occur through less formal means, such as informal ad-
judication, negotiation, speechmaking, dispensing of grants, and even the lifting of 
the administrative eyebrow. 
90. See J. COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL .ADMINISTRATIVE AU-
THORITIES ch. 5 (1927); F. VOM BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 475-89 
(1942); Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Whilslzire Oil Case, 40 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 252 (1940); Lee, Legislative and Interpretative Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1 
(1940). 
91. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 53, at 27; Lee, 
supra note 90. 
92. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 53, at 27. 
The Committee discussed the legal attributes of interpretive rules: 
Most agencies find it useful from time to time to issue interpretations of the stat-
utes under which they operate. These interpretations are ordinarily of an ad-
visory character, indicating merely the meaning of applicable statutory language. 
They are not binding upon those affected, for, if there is disagreement with the 
agency's view, the question may be presented for determination by a court. But 
the agency's interpretations are in any event of considerable importance; custom-
arily they are accepted as determinative by the public at large, and even if they 
are challenged in judicial proceedings, the courts will be influenced though not 
concluded by the administrative opinion. An agency's interpretations may take 
the form of "interpretative rules." More often they are made as a consequence 
of individual requests for rulings upon particular questions; but as "rulings" they 
are often scattered and not easily accessible. 
Id. 
While the Committee thus characterized legislative and interpretive rules differ-
ently, it was aware that these distinctions are often difficult to preserve in applica-
tion: 
In addition to the power to enact legally binding regulations conferred upon 
many of the agencies, all of them may, if they wish, issue interpretations, rulings 
or opinions upon the laws they administer, without statutory authorization to do 
so. . . . Some agencies which issue interpretations couched in general terms 
rather than rulings upon particular facts are careful to distinguish them from 
regulations that have the force of law; other agencies simply promulgate their 
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However, their discussion also indicated a keen awareness of both the 
practical impact of interpretive rules and the deference paid to them 
by reviewing courts. The majority of the Committee favored the 
publication of all rules in the Federal Register but refrained from rec-
ommending specific procedures for rulemaking, partly because of 
concern that excessive hearings would be required when they were 
not needed. 03 When Congress returned to the task of prescribing 
uniform administrative procedures in 1946, it enshrined the difference 
between legislative and interpretive rules in the AP A, 04 with the 
legislative history appearing to suggest an intent to adopt the legal 
effect test. 05 
interpretations as regulations which are indistinguishable in form from those that 
have statutory force. 
Administrative rulemaking, in any event, includes the formulation of both le-
gally binding regulations and interpretative regulations. The former receive stat-
utory force upon going into effect. The latter do not receive statutory force and 
their validity is subject to challenge in any court proceeding in which their appli-
cation may be in question. The statutes themselves and not the regulation re-
main in theory the sole criterion of what the law authorizes or compels and what 
it forbids. An interpretative regulation even of long standing will be rejected 
if it is deemed to be in conflict with a clear and ambiguous statute. 
The distinction between statutory regulations and interpretative regulations 
is, however, blurred by the fact that the courts pay great deference to the inter-
pretative regulations of administrative agencies especially where these have been 
followed for a long time. . . . Although the courts at times avoid the effect 
of this doctrine by refusing to apply administrative interpretations which they 
consider inadmissible, the doctrine has sufficient weight to give much finality to 
the interpretative regulations of administrative agencies. Consequently, the pro-
cedures by which these regulations are prescribed become important to private 
interests and will be considered in this report. 
Id. at 99-100 (footnotes omitted). 
93. Id. at 108. Nevertheless, it strongly approved the various practices of con• 
sultation, conferences, and hearings that had developed by 1941. Id. at 103-08. The 
Committee recommended that all rules having "statutory effect" have a deferred ef-
fective date. Id. at 115. The minority members of the Committee would have re-
quired notice and comment procedures for all rules, legislative and interpretive. Id, 
at 228. In the legislative hearings that followed submission of the Report to Con-
gress, there was relatively little discussion of the problem of interpretations. The 
testimony of Commissioner Healy of the SEC also indicates considerable confusion 
on the part of the Committee members. See Hearings, supra note 54, at 330. 
94. It created a number of exemptions in addition to the one for nonlegislative 
rules. For an excellent critique of some of the other exemptions, see National Wild-
life Fedn. v. Snow, 39 Ad. L.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Bonfield, Military and Foreign 
Affairs Function Rulemaking Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 71 MICH, L. 
REV. 222 (1972); Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to 
Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540 
(1970). The Administrative Conference recommended repeal of these exemptions. 
See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF TIIE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS 69-8, 
73-5 (1976). 
95. The Judiciary Committee staff contended that there was no need to require 
procedural formalities for the adoption of interpretive rules since these are subject 
to plenary judicial review, whereas substantive rules are accorded maximum defer-
ence. See APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 55, at 18. During the Senate de-
bate, Senator McCarran stated that there was no need for any special provision for 
interpretations since they are "merely adaptations [or] interpretations of statutes" 
and subject to a more intensive judicial review." Id. at 313. 
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Many judicial decisions have since weighed claims that the public 
should be allowed to participate in the formulation of rules that the 
agency asserts are interpretive under section 4 of the AP A. Some 
of these cases involve agency interpretations of statutes, while others 
involve interpretations of prior rules. The cases that utilize the legal 
effect standard analyze the rule to determine whether it creates, by 
its own force, a legally binding standard of conduct. Highly relevant 
in this inquiry, of course, is the agency's chosen label. 
A frequently cited case of this type is American President Lines, 
Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Commission.96 According to the federal 
Shipping Act,97 carriers can form a conference to establish uniform 
rates on the shipment of particular items. To deal with competition 
from nonparticipating carriers, the conference would "open" the rate 
on a particular item to competition. After a period of time, it would 
"close" the rate, thereby restoring uniformity. However, section 14b 
of the Shipping Act98 posed a problem: If a conference "terminated" 
a contract rate system, it had to give ninety days notice of such action 
and could not reinstitute the rate without permission from the Federal 
Maritime Commission (FMC). 
The FMC, without public participation, adopted a rule construing 
section 14b. The rule provided that the temporary "opening" of 
a rate was a "termination" under the Act that required ninety 
days notice, and that the "opened" rate could not be closed again 
without the FMC's permission. Carriers claimed the rule was in-
valid because the agency had failed to comply with section 4 pro-
cedures. In an opinion by Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger, the 
District of Columbia Circuit had little difficulty in characterizing the 
rule as interpretive, largely deferring to the label affixed by the agency. 
The court found persuasive the fact that the FMC had treated the 
rule as interpretive by denying that the rule had any "independent 
binding effect on carriers, and [by asserting that] the only 
penalties for action contrary to the rule are those penalties which 
were applicable before promulgation of the rule and indep~ndent of 
the rule, i.e., the penalties provided for violation of the Shipping Act 
itself."99 The court adhered to the legal effect approach even though 
A last helpful piece of commentary is the authoritative ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 
MANUAL ON TIIE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr, supra note 57, at 30 n.3, which 
defines interpretive rules as "rules or statements issued by an agency to advise the 
public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers." 
96. 316 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
97. 46 u.s.c. §§ 801-842 (1970). 
98. 46O.S.C. § 813(a) (1970). 
99. 316 F.2d at 421-22. The court also held that the petitioner's objection to the 
lack of public participation was moot. 316 F.2d at 421. 
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it admitted that the rule would have significant practical impact: 
[T]his rule undeniably deals with a matter of great importance to 
petitioners' business activities . . . . 
. . . Whatever practical or psychological effect this rule may have 
on the conduct of petitioners-and we do not doubt that it may 
have some pragmatic consequences-its legal effect is essentially that 
of an opinion of the legal staff. Neither the affected parties nor the 
courts are bound by it unless they elect to adopt it as a correct 
interpretation of the statute.100 
Frequently, a rule purports to interpret an earlier one. If the 
later rule only clarifies the earlier rule without amending it, no public 
participation is required.101 If, however, the later rule amends the 
earlier one, APA rule-making procedures are obligatory.102 It is 
quite difficult to determine whether a prior rule has actually been 
amended or merely interpreted. The leading case applying the legal 
effect test in this situation is Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder. 103 At issue 
in Gibson Wine was a regulation that required wine derived from 
a particular fruit to be designated by the name of that fruit. The 
issue concerned boysenberry wine; since the boysenberry is a variety 
of blackberry, was boysenberry wine to be labelled as "blackberry 
wine" or "boysenberry wine"? After considerable vacillation, the 
deputy commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service finally ruled 
that it had to be labelled as "boysenberry wine." This ruling was 
particularly disadvantageous to bottlers of boysenberry wine, who 
protested that wines made from other varieties of blackberries could 
be labelled "blackberry wine." Plaintiff argued that this ruling was 
an amendment to the existing regulation, thereby requiring public 
participation under both the AP A and a specific provision of the 
Intoxicating Liquor Law .104 
The District of Columbia Circuit held that no public participation 
was required, since the rule was interpretive rather than legislative. 
The court used the legal effect test, remarking that legislative rules 
create law whereas interpretive rules state what the administrator 
thinks the law means. Since the ruling was merely the agency's 
100. 316 F.2d at 421-22. Other cases that employ the legal effect test in analyz-
ing the interpretive rule issue include Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757, 
763 n.12 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974); United States v. 353 
Cases, 247 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 834 (1958). 
101. If the subsequent rule is only interpretive of the earlier one, the later rule 
could be retroactive. See Fleming v. Van Der Loo, 160 F.2d 906, 913 (D.C. Cir. 
1947). However, it would be substantively invalid if it was inconsistent with the 
earlier rule. See Barron Coop. Creamery v. Wickard, 140 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 
1944). 
102. Detroit Edison Co. v. EPA, 496 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1974). 
103. 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952), noted in 1 J. PUB. L. 491 (1952). 
104. 27 u.s.c. § 205(f) (1970). 
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opinion as to the meaning of an existing regulation, it was held to 
be interpretive in nature. The court observed that interpretations 
receive a more intensive degree of judicial scrutiny than legislative 
rules, noted that the lower court had provided plenary review, and 
affirmed its holding that the interpretation was substantively correct.105 
Judge Miller, in dissent, argued that the prior regulation was 
completely changed by the subsequent ruling. Previously all wine 
made from varieties of blackberry was permitted to be labelled black-
berry wine; now the agency had created a special category for one 
"large and luscious" variety. He felt that this ruling could not be 
interpretive because the earlier rule was clear and did not need any 
interpretation. He added that the ruling had the force and effect 
of Iaw100 and also seemed to feel that due process considerations 
were involved.107 
B. The Substantial Impact Test 
In sharp contrast to the cases that distinguish between legislative 
and nonlegislative rules according to their legal effect are cases 
that consider the pragmatic effect of the rule determinative. It is 
not always clear from these cases whether the courts are rejecting 
the legal effect test as a definitional tool, or whether they accept it 
but require that notice and comment procedures be employed in the 
interest of fairness. Although the substantial impact cases are 
responsive to the public's need to participate in rulemaking, they fur-
nish little predictable guidance to an agency that must decide what 
procedures to employ. In addition, the courts using the test have 
failed to explain how it is consistent with the language of section 
4. 
105. See 194 F.2d 332-33. 
106. See 194 F.2d at 335 (Miller, J., dissenting). Presumably, Judge Miller 
meant that the subsequent rule was legislative, and, therefore, by definition, it bad 
the force of law. It is also possible that he meant that the ruling had the force of 
law in a practical sense, since the sanctions for violations were sufficiently severe 
to induce compliance. If so, his opinion is a precursor of the substantial impact test 
that emerged twenty years later. 
107. See 194 F.2d at 336 (Miller, J., dissenting). Other cases that classify sub-
sequent regulations as interpretive, largely by reference to the agency's label, are 
Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455 (Erner. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 
(1975) (dictum); Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974); National 
Assn. of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 489 F.2d 1268 
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Garelick Mfg. Co. v. Dillon, 313 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1963); 
Mitchell v. Edward S. Wagner Co., 217 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 
U.S. 964 (1955); National Restaurant Assn. v. Simon, 411 F. Supp. 993 (D.D.C. 
1976). But see Detroit Edison Co. v. EPA, 496 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1974) (sub-
sequent regulation classified as legislative despite its label, since it changed obliga-
tions of a regulated company). 
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l. Policy Statements 
The foundation of the substantial impact test was laid in Texaco, 
Inc. v. FPC,1°8 in which the court's discussion of policy statements 
was tangential to its holding. In that case, suit was brought to chal-
lenge a Federal Power Commission (FPC) regulation amended 
without public participation to require compound interest rather than 
simple interest on refunds. To justify its lack of public procedures, 
the FPC first relied on the AP A provision that permits an agency 
to dispense with notice and comment procedures if they are "unnec-
essary,"100 but the court held this exemption was inapplicable. As 
an apparent afterthought, the agency tried to characterize its rule 
as a policy statement. This position was doomed to defeat since the 
agency's own conduct was inconsistent with it.110 In analyzing this 
claim, the court first defined a policy statement in traditional terms-
as "one that does not impose any rights and obligations on an oper-
ator."111 Using this test, the court held that the amendment was not 
a policy statement since it imposed a new obligation for the payment 
of compound interest on refunds, one which an operator would have 
the burden of proving should not apply in any waiver or similar pro-
ceeding.112 
It was, however, the ensuing discussion of the values of public 
participation in rulemaking that was seized upon by subsequent 
courts. According to the court, notice and comment procedures give 
the public an opportunity to participate and enable the agency to 
educate itself "before establishing rules and procedures which have 
a substantial impact on those regulated."113 But the Texaco court 
108. 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969). 
109. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (1970) ("when the agency for good cause 
finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the 
rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, 
or contrary to the public interest"). 
110. The regulation was not placed with the agency's interpretations and policy 
statements in the Code of Federal Regulations. The agency had never relied on the 
policy statement exception, and the court felt that its review power was limited to 
testing the validity of the theory used by the agency. See 412 F.2d at 744 nn.8 & 
9. Moreover, the compound interest rule seemingly was not a policy statement, since 
it did not relate to a discretionary function. It would have been more plausible to 
characterize it as an interpretive rule, since it explains the meaning of the word "in-
terest" in section 4(e) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970). 
111. 412 F.2d at 744. 
112. See 412 F.2d at 743-44. The court apparently felt that a new obligation 
was imposed by reason of a shift of the burden of proof. 'See text at notes 65-69 
supra. 
113. 412 F.2d at 744 (emphasis added). The court apparently drew support from 
National Motor Freight Traffic Assn. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 95 (D.D.C. 
1967) (three-judge court), affd. per curiam, 393 U.S. 18 (1968), which referred to the 
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did not use the substantial impact test to determine that the 
compound interest rule was not a policy statement. Instead, the -
phrase was dropped in connection with a general treatment of the 
importance of public participation in rulemaking. 
The substantial impact analysis was elevated from dictum to doc-
trine in Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor.114 In order to issue a 
visa for permanent residence, the Secretary of Labor must certify 
that there is a shortage of domestic workers in the alien's trade and 
that his admission will not adversely affect the wages and working 
conditions of similarly employed American workers. To simplify the 
determinations involved, the Secretary published Schedule C, which 
listed occupations for which labor was in short supply and which was 
to be reviewed continuously. Aliens in the trades listed in Schedule 
C could be "precertified," meaning that they were excused from 
having to submit a specific job offer to receive a visa. Various 
versions of Schedule C were adopted with public participation under 
the AP A, but the schedule was revoked by a directive on February 
9, 1970, without any public participation. Plaintiffs were persons 
who had been precertified under the prior procedure, but whose 
visas had not yet been granted. In order to retain their priority after 
Schedule C was revoked, plaintiffs had to submit specific job offers; 
since they failed to do so, their labor certification was revoked. 
The court had no difficulty characterizing the Secretary's direc-
tive as a rule rather than "a fact determination regarding the domestic 
labor market," as the district court had found.115 The Secretary then 
argued that the rule was procedural, interpretive, or a policy state-
ment, and therefore exempt from AP A rule-making procedures. The 
court noted that labels were not conclusive and applied the same test 
to all three claims: 
[The rule] changed existing rights and obligations by requiring aliens 
of the class of appellants to submit proof of specific job offers as 
well as a statement of their qualifications; it thereby made it more 
difficult for employers to fill vacancies in the occupations no longer 
precertified. By virtue of this substantial impact both upon the 
aliens and the employers, notice and opportunity for comment by 
the public should first be provided. 116 
impact of a rule in deciding whether it fell within the APA exception for procedural 
rules. 
114. 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972). Judge Hays dissented without a written 
opinion. 
115. See 479 F.2d at 481, quoting 337 F. Supp. 1289, 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
The court held that the directive fit the definition of a rule in the AP A as "an 
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to 
implement. .. law or policy .... " 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970). 
116. 469 F.2d at 482 (emphasis added). The court relied on Texaco, cases con-
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It is not at all clear from this language whether the court found the 
rule procedurally invalid under the legal effect test, or whether it 
rejected the legal effect test in favor of the substantial impact test 
and found the rule invalid under the latter. 
The confusion in the Second Circuit's decision is particularly 
striking when compared to the carefully reasoned decision of the dis-
trict court.117 The district judge pointed out that, while precertifi-
cation at the time of application for the visa was a convenient pro-
cedure, the statute requires an analysis of the American labor market 
at the time of the alien's admission. Since the Secretary had no 
power to guarantee admission through precertification, the proce-
dure could be considered a policy statement, a practice without legal 
effect, or an invalid legislative rule, any of which could be revoked 
without public participation. 
The decision of the Second Circuit took an entirely different 
tack. It observed that the directive changed existing rights and ob-
ligations. This could not be correct, however, since, as the district 
court had shown, precertified aliens had no legal right to admission 
and the Secretary had no obligations toward them. Evidently, there-
fore, the court of appeals was concerned less with legally defined rights 
and obligations than with the practical effect of the revocation on the 
interests of both employers and alien employees. The Secretary had 
definitively terminated an advantageous status involving a substantial 
class of persons. Under the prior practice, precertified alien employ-
ees were protected from the burden of having to obtain and prove a 
specific job offer, both at the time of application for a visa and at the 
time of admission. Now they were no longer protected. Whether 
Schedule C and its revocation ever created or abolished any legal rights 
or obligations was obviously not determinative. 
Lewis-Mota is well worth comparing with Noel v. Chapman, de-
cided by a different panel of the Second Circuit in 1975, which also 
involved discretionary immigration determinations.U8 The Noel 
panel recognized the existence of the "substantial impact" test, but, 
quoting Lewis-Mota, it remarked that "ordinarily" the only rules that 
have a substantial impact are those that change "existing rights and 
obligations."119 As we have seen, however, the rule in Lewis-Mota 
did not affect legal rights and obligations; rather it changed a status 
struing the procedural exemption, and Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, discussed in 
text at notes 133-38, which involved interpretive rules. 
117. 337 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
118. See text at notes 82-87 supra. 
119. 508 F.2d at 1030, quoting Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d at 
482. 
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of great practical importance. The instruction in Noel, which pre-
vented the routine extension of deportation for a particular class of 
deportable aliens, operated in a like fashion. Thus, the two rules 
had similar practical effect, and those two Second Circuit immigration 
decisions appear to be sharply inconsistent. 
The substantial impact test was forthrightly adopted by a panel 
of the District of Columbia Circuit in Pickus v. United States Board 
of Parole.120 The parole board adopted rules concerning the criteria 
to be considered in granting parole.121 Later it formulated more 
specific guidelines that prescribed the number of months customarily 
to be served before release, depending on the severity of the crime 
and the characteristics of the offender.122 Although the rules and 
the guidelines were published in the Federal Register, they were 
adopted without public participation. 
After finding that the Board of Parole is an agency covered by 
the AP A,123 the court held that neither the rules nor the guidelines 
could be treated as policy statements. Consequently, both were 
invalid.124 The court registered its agreement with "several courts 
[that] have ruled that agency action cannot be a general state-
ment of policy if it substantially affects the right of persons subject 
to agency regulations . . . . [The] outer boundary of the general 
policy exemption derives from congressional purpose in enacting 
section 4-that the interested public should have an opportunity to 
participate, and the agency should be fully informed, before rules 
having such substantial impact are promulgated."125 Although the 
120. 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Accord, Ramer v. Saxbe, 522 F.2d 695 
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bureau of Prisons). See Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 
543 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (subsequent decision denying prisoners right to com-
ment orally on the rules). 
121. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1975). 
122. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.18-.19 (1975). See generally Project, supra note 3. 
123. 507 F.2d at 111-12. According to staff of the Board of Parole, the Board's 
reason for contesting the Pickus case was its concern over whether the Board should 
be classified as an agency under the APA. It feared that an unfavorable precedent 
on this point might result in exposure of its quasi-judicial functions to the adjudica• 
tion provisions of the APA. The Board was relatively unconcerned with whether the 
rule-making requirements of the AP A were applicable to it. It has had little diffi. 
culty in complying with the Pickus decision. 
124. See 507 F.2d at 1114. The court declared that this holding was not retro-
active. Therefore, invalidly adopted regulations were allowed to determine the parole 
status of many prisoners. But see Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 
607 ( 1944), discussed in note 237 infra and accompanying text. 
125. 507 F.2d at 1112. The court relied on Texaco and Lewis-Mota, as well as 
on cases construing the procedural exemption. See National Motor Freight Traffic 
Assn. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge court), affd., 393 
U.S. 18 (1968); Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Gronouski, 230 F. Supp. 44 (D.D. 
C. 1964). 
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court spoke of "the rights of persons," the balance of its opinion 
made clear that it was speaking not of "rights" in the strict sense, 
for no prisoner has a "right" to parole, but rather of a "substan-
tial effect on ultimate parole decisions,"126 or "significant con-
sequences. "127 
If the court had chosen to do so, it could easily have followed 
the traditional analysis of cases like Pacific Gas & Electric128 to char-
acterize both the rules and the guidelines as policy statements: 
( 1) the rules did not set forth a standard that the public 
must obey; 
(2) the agency generally labelled them as policy statements 
and guidelines, although sometimes they were called rules; 
(3) the orders used many tentative words and appeared to be 
temporary in duration; 
( 4) they were directed at the agency staff, not at the public; 
and 
( 5) aggrieved persons could try to persuade decisionmakers 
not to apply the rules in, particular cases. 
It seems clear that the Pickus decision squarely rejects the tra-
ditional legal effect test; instead, it distinguishes between legislative 
rules and policy statements by analyzing the practical effect of the 
rule.129 Under this approach, if the public should have been involved 
in the formulation of the rule, it follows that the rule is to be deemed 
legislative. 
The Pickus decision reached a sound result. The rules and 
guidelines enunciated by the United States Board of Parole had in-
deed sharply altered the discretionary powers of parole board de-
cisionmakers. Considering the Board's massive caseload, the rules 
will, in effect, be dispositive in the great majority of cases. It 
follows that prisoners and other members of the public should have 
been involved in their promulgation. However, the reasoning of 
Pickus is open to serious criticisms. Most importantly, the court 
overlooked the fundamental point that the parole board had no 
legislative rule-making power.13° Consequently, its rules and guide-
126. 507 F.2d at 1112-13. 
127. 507 F.2d at 1113. 
128. Pacific Ga.9 & Electric, decided only four months before by a different panel 
of the D.C. Circuit, is discussed in text at notes 65-81 supra. 
129. Other decisions have applied substantial impact analysis to rules that the 
agency sought to characterize as policy statements. See, e.g., Citizens Communica-
tions Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1204 n.5 (D.D. Cir. 1971) (dictum); Nader 
v. Butterfield, 373 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1974) (FAA memorandum permitting 
x-ray checks of baggage). 
130. See K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 150-54; Koch, supra note 9, at 1065, Both 
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lines could not be legislative rules. Moreover, the court simply 
failed to explain how its decision could be reconciled with the legis-
lative history of section 4 of the AP A, which seems to embrace the 
legal effect test.131 As will be explained later in this article, the 
sound result in Pickus could have been achieved without doing vio-
lence to the statute.132 
2. Interpretive Rules 
An influential case applying the substantial impact test to a rule 
that interpreted a statute is Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion v. Finch,133 decided in 1970. The 1962 amendments to the. 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act134 require that manufacturers estab-
lish by "substantial evidence" the "effectiveness" both of new drugs 
and of those marketed between 1938 and 1962. The statute defines 
substantial evidence to mean "adequate and well-controlled investi-
gations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by 
scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
drug involved. . . ."135 
In 1969, without public participation, the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) adopted a regulation136 that purported to inter-
pret the language of this statute. In addition to prescribing criteria 
for "adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations," the rule 
provided that other clinical tests and documented clinical experience 
were irrelevant. Moreover, the affected drug company would be en-
titled to a hearing only if it demonstrated in advance a likelihood 
that it could produce substantial evidence of the drug's effectiveness. 
Plaintiff brought an action contending that the rule was invalid 
because of the agency's failure to provide preadoption notice and 
comment procedures. The FDA argued that the rule was both inter-
pretive and procedural, but the court effectively disposed of both 
contentions. Refusing to be bound by the agency's labels, the court 
noted that the underlying policy of section 4 "at least requires that 
when a proposed regulation of general applicability has a substantial 
impact on the regulated industry, or an important class of the mem-
authors further criticize Pickus for applying the standard of judicial review applicable 
to legislative rules. 
131. See text at notes 52-58, 90-95 supra. 
132. See text at notes 174-76 infra. 
133. 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970). 
134. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act §§ 505(d)-(e), 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d)-
(e) (1970). 
135. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1970). 
136. 34 Fed. Reg. 14,596 (1969). 
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bers or the products of that industry, notice and opportunity for com-
ment should first be provided."137 The court then analyzed in detail 
the immediate and substantial impact of the regulation on the drug 
industry and found that: 
( 1) the regulations were pervasive in scope, applying to thous-
ands of drugs; 
(2) the regulations had a retroactive effect since they threat-
ened drugs already on the market; 
( 3) the FD A's position substantially narrowed its previous, 
more flexible stance on the issue, and thus it represented an important 
change in position; and 
( 4) the regulation caused substantial confusion in the indus-
try, was extremely complex, and was intensely controversial.138 
The substantial impact test has also been applied to rules that 
purport to interpret previously adopted rules. These decisions de-
part sharply from the legal effect test embraced in the Gibson Wine 
case discussed earlier.139 One such case is the Eighth Circuit de-
cision in American Bancorporation v. Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System.140 The Bank Holding Company Act pro-
hibits a bank holding company from acquiring an interest in a non-
banking organization uniess the Federal Reserve Board determines 
that the new business is "so closely related to banking . . . as to 
be a proper incident thereof."141 A regulation, adopted after notice 
137. 307 F. Supp. at 863. The court relied on Texaco, see text at notes 108-
13 supra, which primarily involved the "unnecessary" exemption, as well as cases in• 
volving the "procedure" exemption, e.g., National Motor Freight Traffic Assn. v. 
United States, 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge court), affd., 393 U.S. 18 
(1968) (per curiam). Similar exemption cases, also cited by the court, are NLRB 
v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) ("procedure" exemption), and Sea-
board World Airlines v. Gronouski, 230 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1964) ("agency man• 
agement" exception). 
Professors Koch and Davis read Pharmaceutical Manufacturers as requiring addi-
tional rule-making procedures because of a perceived need for fairness, as distinguished 
from constituting a reclassification of the rules as legislative. See K. DAVIS, supra note 
9, at 196-97; Koch, supra note 9, at 1062. The language employed by the court is 
vague and is fairly susceptible to either reading. However, as Koch concedes, the 
court did rely on National Motor Freight, which clearly used the substantial impact 
test. 
138. See 307 F. Supp. at 864-66. Other cases that utilize substantial impact an• 
alysis to decide whether a rule is interpretive are Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 
discussed in text at notes 114-19 supra; Cattle Feeders Tax Comm. v. Shultz, 74• 
1 U.S. Tax. Cas. 83,067 (W.D. Okla), revd. on other grounds, 504 F.2d 462 (10th 
Cir. 1974). 
139. See text at notes 103-07 supra. 
140. 509 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1974). See Note, supra note 9. 
141. Bank Holding Company Act § 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (c)(8) (1970). 
For another case in which a second regulation interpreted an earlier one under this 
statutory scheme, see National Assn. of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Board of Governors of 
Fed. Reserve Sys., 489 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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and comment, listed certain activities that the Board considered 
closely related to banking. A provision of that regulation permitted 
a holding company to act "as investment or financial adviser, in-
cluding (i) serving as the advisory company for a mortgage or a real 
estate investment trust, and (ii) furnishing economic or financial in-
formation. "142 
Northwest Bancorporation (Banco) applied for permission to ac-
quire a firm that specialized in advising state and local governments 
on financial matters. After the application was filed, the Board 
amended its regulation without public participation to allow holding 
companies to act "as investment or financial adviser to the extent 
of . . . providing financial advice to state and local govemments."143 
Relying on the amended rule, the Board approved Banco's appli-
cation. 
The Eighth Circuit found the adoption of the second rule valid 
since it had no substantial impact on the competitors of Banco. The 
court's major reason for this conclusion was that, by substituting the 
language "to the extent of' for "including," the second rule had 
narrowed the original regulation, thereby making it more difficult 
for bank holding companies to expand. Additionally, the court 
pointed out that the entire subject matter had been fully canvassed 
in the initial rule-making hearings. Under the analysis first sug-
gested in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, the second regulation 
seemed neither complex nor pervasive, did not drastically change 
existing law, seemed to cause no confusion or controversy, and had 
no significant retroactive effect.144 
C. The Tests Clash: Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights 
The divergent streams of analysis exemplified by the legal effect 
and substantial impact tests finally intersected in Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon,145 resulting in a six to three 
split in the District of Columbia Circuit. The case involved an attack 
on the validity of Revenue Ruling 69-545, 146 which interpreted the 
142. 36 Fed. Reg. 10,777 (1971) (emphasis added). 
143. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (5) (1976) (emphasis added). 
144. An additional portion of the opinion remanded the case for a trial-type hear-
ing on adjudicatory facts involved in Banco's application. 
Other cases that apply substantial impact analysis to determine whether a second 
regulation is interpretive or legislative are Continental Oil Co. v. Burns, 317 F. Supp. 
194 (D. Del. 1970); Anderson v. Butz, 37 Ad. L.2d 852 (E.D. Cal. 1975). 
145. 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), revd. on other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1917 
(1976). The Supreme Court held that the complaint should have been dismissed be-
cause the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. 
146, 1969-2 C.B. 117. 
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word "charitable" in a tax provision147 exempting charitable organi-
zations from income tax. In this ruling, the IRS reversed itself, ex-
pressly abrogating an earlier ruling148 that had conditioned the tax-
exempt status of a private hospital on its provision of free or below-
cost medical treatment to indigents. As is customary for published 
rulings, the IRS did not provide for public notice and comment for 
either ruling. 140 The district court upheld the plaintiffs substantive 
attack on the second ruling, 150 without reaching the issue of whether 
it was invalid under the AP A for lack of public participation. -
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the ruling was not 
co.ntrary to congressional intent. It also disagreed with plaintiff's 
procedural argument. Adopting the traditional legal effect test, the 
majority concluded that the ruling was interpretive and that notice 
and comment procedures were not required. Because the rule inter-
preted the meaning of the word "charitable" in the statute, the court 
was not bound by the ruling, although it might choose to accept the 
ruling as a proper interpretation.151 
In a footnote, the court confronted the substantial impact test. 
It recognized the impact of the ruling on the poor, the Service's lack 
of expertise concerning the problem of medical care delivery, and 
the Service's sharp reversal of position, but concluded: "[W]hile 
these factors have been considered by the courts with respect to 
whether notice and hearing are required by the AP A, they are not 
determinative here where a ruling is clearly interpretative in nature 
and has no legally binding effect."152 This footnote is disingenuous; 
the cases relying on the substantial impact test used it even though 
a rule was clearly interpretive of words in a statute or regulation and 
even though it had no legally binding effect.158 Thus, the majority 
did not distinguish the substantial impact test but rather squarely re-
jected it. 
In dissent on this point, Judge Wright observed that, while the 
ruling portended a substantial change in the availability of hospital 
services for the poor, neither the poor nor anyone else was given 
147. I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3). 
148. Rev. Ru!. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202. 
149. However, the IRS has recently invited public comment and provided for de-
ferred effectiveness in regard to a proposed revenue procedure. Announcement 75-
42, 1975-19 I.R.B. 138. Revenue procedures relate to IRS policy and discretion or 
provide procedural instructions, while revenue rulings interpret the tax code. 
150. See 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973). 
151. See 506 F.2d at 1290. The court relied on Gibson Wine, discussed in text 
at notes 103-07 supra. 
152. 506 F.2d at 1291 n.30. 
153. See text at notes 133-44 supra. 
January 19771 Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements 555 
notice or allowed to comment. He pointed out that the IRS is not 
expert in health care delivery problems and that, consequently, ex-
perts in this field should have assisted the IRS in reaching an in-
formed decision whether to relax the obligations of private hospitals 
to the poor.154 
Rehearing en bane was denied, although Judges Wright and 
Robinson and Chief Judge Bazelon voted for it. Chief Judge Baze-
Ion's brief opinion pungently criticized the use of the legal effect test, 
since the majority had failed to make a de novo examination of the 
substantive issues involved but had merely deferred to the agency. 
Ashe put it, 
[T]he majority tells the plaintiffs that it will not be bound by the 
[IRS] interpretation of the term "charitable" and then turns right 
around and upholds the Service interpretation as a permissible exer-
cise of discretion on the basis of factual assumptions which are not 
supported by a record and which plaintiffs have not had an oppor-
tunity to rebut.155 
The majority probably was correct in characterizing the ruling 
as an interpretive rule under traditional legal effect analysis. IRS 
rulings make no definitive changes in the tax law; they have always 
been treated by the agency as interpretive and courts often grant 
them remarkably little deference.156 In one important respect, how-
ever, a ruling like Revenue Ruling 69-545 is different from most rev-
enue rulings. Generally, a ruling unfavorable to taxpayers is un-
likely to have any legal effect, and taxpayers have ample opportunity 
to challenge it before the agency as well as the courts. But Revenue 
Ruling 69-545 is favorable to the taxpayer and unfavorable to poor 
persons needing hospital services. Those adversely affected will 
have no opportunity to persuade the IRS that its ruling was incorrect, 
for there will be no subsequent administrative proceedings, since 
they are not adversely affected as taxpayers. Indeed, in its decision 
in Eastern Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the poor persons 
challenging the ruling lacked standing to obtain judicial review. 
Under these circumstances, it could be argued that a revenue ruling 
that will not be subject to any further administrative proceedings 
might have sufficient legal effect to be characterized as a legislative 
rule. 
154. See 506 F.2d at 1291-92. 
155. 506 F.2d at 1293 (footnotes omitted). 
156. See, e.g., Stubbs, Overbeck & Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142 
(5th Cir. 1971); Grace E. Lang, 64 T.C. 404 (1975). For a case according some 
deference to revenue rulings, see Gino v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 97 S. Ct. 490 (1976). See Comment, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 1135, supra note 
9, at 1140 n.34 
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If substantial impact is the test, however, it would be difficult 
to find a clearer case in which public participation should be man-
datory.157 The Service's ruling apparently had a profound effect on 
the availability of health care for poor people, it amounted to a 
complete reversal of the Service's previous position, the matter was 
highly controversial, and the IRS was functioning in an area where 
it had no expertise. 
D. A Critique of Present Case Law 
As we have seen, the courts have fashioned two dissimilar 
methods of determining if the agency must give notice and invite 
comments before adopting what the agency considers to be an inter-
pretive rule or a policy statement. The legal effect approach gener-
ally yields more predictable results and is more solidly grounded in 
the AP A. The substantial impact test is more responsive to the 
public's need to participate in the formulation of important rules, but 
it is rather unpredictable and lacks an adequate statutory basis. 
Although the legal effect test usually furnishes predictable re-
sults, this is not always so. 158 Many policy statements, for example, 
arguably have legal effect -because they confer or withdraw a "priv-
ilege" or an "immunity."159 If a policy statement assures a favor-
able or unfavorable exercise of agency discretion, does it not confer 
or withdraw a privilege or an immunity? If so, it would seem to 
have the requisite legal effect and thus should properly be treated 
as a legislative rule. Moreover, the other factors sometimes used 
in applying the legal effect test are not particularly helpful. Dis-
tinctions based on tentativeness or temporariness are elusive, and a 
rule might be addressed either to the staff or to the public without 
any real difference in impact.16° Furthermore, it is difficult to clas-
157. One impact of the ruling was that it aborted congressional consideration of 
the issue. See 506 F.2d at 1289. 
158. For example, even if the traditional legal effect test is adopted, it is difficult 
to determine how the FCC's 1970 policy statement on license renewal criteria should 
be classified. Although labelled as a policy statement, it appeared to work a de-
finitive and permanent change in renewal proceedings. Similarly, the policy state-
ment on children's television appears to impose new obligations on licensees. See 
39 Fed. Reg. 39,395 (1974). 
159. See 1 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1976). 
160. Many discretionary rules can be directed to either the staff or the public. 
For example, many of the policy statements of the CAB are directed to airlines or 
cities but could just as easily have been addressed to the staff. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. 
§§ 399.11, 399.45, 399.80 (1976). The FPC rule involved in Pacific Gas & Electric, 
see text at notes 65-81 supra, which set priorities for natural gas allocations, could 
easily have been an instruction addressed to pipeline companies on how to allocate 
the gas. It could also have been a directive to the staff concerning the acceptance 
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sify a rule by making judgments about the adequacy of subsequent 
administrative redress. 
Similarly, it is frequently difficult to decide whether a rule that 
construes particular statutory language is interpretive or legis-
lative.101 As will be discussed more completely in the next section 
of this article, 162 generalized rule-making power in the statute is 
sufficient to confer the aJ.Ithority to adopt legislative rules. More-
over, the agency may have neglected to label the rule, and it may 
not be clear whether the agency views the rule as binding on the 
public. Interpretive rules are usually neither tentative nor tempo-
rary. Finally, even if their effect on regulated parties is subject to 
a probably illusory administrative reconsideration, their effect on 
others, such as consumers or competitors, may be definitive and vir-
tually unreviewable.163 
In situations where a rule interprets a prior rule, there is no in-
telligible way to ascertain whether the prior rule has been amended 
or only modified. Of course, if the two are wildly inconsistent, it 
is fairly obvious that the second rule was an amendment. More typi-
cally, however, the second rule introduces new and perhaps unex-
pected classifications, distinctions, or emphases in the first rule.164 
Whether the first rule has been changed or only interpreted cannot 
be determined in a principled manner. 
Moreover, the traditional test relies to an unacceptable degree 
on the label used by the agency. Yet that label might have been 
chosen precisely for the purpose of avoiding public participation, 
permitting retroactivity, 165 or discouraging preenforcement judicial 
review.100 We have been cautioned not to place excessive reliance 
on labels, 167 and that warning is particularly appropriate when the 
of filings. By the same token, many legislative rules relating to discretionary matters 
seemingly could have been written as instructions to staff rather than to the public. 
See, e.g., Johnson's Professional Nursing Home v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 841 (5th 
Cir. 1974). 
161. See, e.g., 39 Fed. Reg. 20,723 (1974) (FCC notice respecting access by 
political candidates to prime time); Baird, Prospective Interpretative Rule-Making by 
the SEC, 25 Bus. L. 1581, 1603-09 (1970). 
162. See text at notes 178-91 infra. 
163. The rule in Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights was of this nature. See Independent 
Broker-Dealers' Trade Assn. v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132, 140 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 828 (1971). 
164. See Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 465 
(N.D. Tex. 1963) (three-judge court) (judges disagreed sharply over whether the 
second rule constituted an amendment or merely an interpretation of the prior rule). 
165. See text at notes 233-53 infra. 
166. See text at notes 192-218 infra. 
167. E.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); In-
dependent Broker-Dealers' Trade Assn. v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132, 140-41 (D.C. Cir.), 
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issue is the opportunity for those affected by the rule to contribute 
to its formulation.168 
Unlike the traditional analysis, the substantial impact test is at-
tentive to the need for public participation. Its approach is straight-
forward: the public should participate in the making of rules that 
have a substantial impact on its interests. It does not matter whether 
the interest damaged or enhanced is a legal right or obligation; it 
could be a status, an expectation, or a business or personal practice 
or relationship. 
· However, the substantial impact test suffers from the serious 
defect of unpredictability of result.1O0 Much depends upon the 
strength of a plaintiffs claim that the rule has a substantial impact 
on himself and others similarly situated. Also significant is the court's 
intuition as to whether the litigant is playing an obstructionist role or 
can make a worthwhile contribution in the formulation of the rule. 
Some courts have employed a collection of factors in determining 
the substantiality of the impact of a rule, such as the rule's complex-
ity, the pervasiveness of its impact, the degree of controversy sur-
rounding it, the seriousness of its retroactive effect, 170 the abruptness 
of change in the agency's position, or the agency's need for instruc-
tion and guidance. Each of these factors is vague and can be readily 
manipulated.171 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FfC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). As Chief Justice Warren once wrote, 
"[h]ow simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally 
if specific problems could be solved by inspection of labels pasted on them!" Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958). But see K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 148. 
168. For example, all of the rules adopted by agencies that have no rule-making 
power, such as the EEOC, are, by definition, interpretive or policy statements. The 
public is never entitled to participate in any of the rulemaking of these agencies, no 
matter how critical the rules are in implementing the statutory scheme. 
169. Professor Koch suggests that courts might require agencies to use whatever 
pre- or postadoption procedures the court finds appropriate in the interests of fairness. 
See Koch, supra note 9, at 1066-68. In my view, this proposal magnifies the unpre-
dictability of the substantial impact test. It is probably better to require the agencies 
to observe the section 4 procedures, rather than a tailor-made procedure, if its non-
legislative rules have a substantial impact. 
170. If a rule is more likely to be legislative if it has retroactive effect, an inter-
esting anomaly is presented. Generally, under the traditional analysis, interpretive 
rules were retroactive and legislative rules were prospective. See text at notes 233-
53 infra. Thus a retroactive rule is likely to be classed as interpretive by a court 
using traditional analysis but as legislative by a court using substantial impact an-
alysis. 
171. A recent commentary attempts to synthesize the factors that a court should 
consider in assessing substantial impact. See Comment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV, 430, 
supra, note 9. The author focuses on the need to protect outsiders, the extent to 
which they will have subsequent opportunities to challenge the rule, the extent to 
which the agency could utilize public input, and considerations of administrative ef-
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The substantial impact test also contains a flaw considerably more 
fundamental than unpredictability. The cases applying the test have 
utterly failed to explain how it is consistent with section 4 of the 
AP A. The history of the nonlegislative rule exemption of the AP A 
indicates that Congress shared the understanding of contempora-
neous commentary172 that drew the distinction in terms of legal ef-
fect. The difference between legislative rules on the one hand and 
interpretive rules and policy statements on the other was well under-
stood in 1946. Whether a rule was legislative depended upon 
whether it was binding on the public, not upon its practical effect. 
Unfortunately, the decisions that define non-legislative rules by an 
assessment of their impact on the public have supplied no analysis of 
the consistency of that test with the AP A. As a consequence, the 
substantial impact test, in its present form, seems an unlikely candi-
date to survive Supreme Court review.173 
Nevertheless, the legislative history of the nonlegislative rule 
exemption does supply a solid foundation for use of the substantial 
impact test as a method of assuring fair procedures rather than as 
a definitional tool. It admonishes the agencies that they were not 
precluded from using notice and comment procedures and empha-
sizes that, on the contrary, they could utilize such procedures at their 
discretion. As the Senate Judiciary Committee noted: 
Agencies are given discretion to dispense with notice ( and conse-
quently with public proceedings) in the case of interpretative rules, 
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, pro-
cedure, or practice. This does not mean, however, that agencies 
should not-where useful to them or helpful to the public-under-
take public procedures in connection with such rule-making.174 
This legislative history provides fertile soil in which the substan-
tial impact test could take root. It suggests that an agency should 
not treat all of its nonlegislative rules alike. Instead, it should decide 
in each case whether public participation is desirable. Such partici-
ficiency. However, the vagueness of these factors diminishes the usefulness of this an-
alysis. 
172. See notes 52-58 and 90-95 supra and accompanying text. 
173. See K DAVIS, supra note 9, at 193-95; Koch, supra note 9. Both Professors 
Koch and Davis criticize the substantial impact text as a definitional tool. An inter-
pretive ru1e or policy statement that has a substantial impact does not become a legi~-
lative rule for that reason. But both authors agree with the results of the substantial 
impact cases, viewing them as attempts by courts to impose extra-statutory procedural 
requirements on the agencies in the interests of fairness. Koch argues that the courts 
should desigr~ an appropriate procedure tailor-made for each case. See Koch, supra 
at 1065-67. In addition, see Independent Broker Dealers' Trade Assn. v. SEC, 442 
F.2d 132, 144 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971). 
174. °See APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 55, at 187. 
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pation would be particularly appropriate when the agency staff 
knows, or has reason to know, that the procedures might significantly 
protect the public and educate the agency. In short, preadoption 
procedures should be used whenever the rule would have a substan-
tial impact upon an appreciable segment of the public.175 If the 
agency failed to provide notice and comment procedures, despite the 
fact the rule would have a substantial impact on the public, a court 
could readily find the omission reversible error. Its holding would 
not be that the rule was legislative despite its lack of legal effect 
but rather that the agency's chosen rule-making procedure amounted 
to an abuse of discretion. This abuse could be rectified by the courts 
in the same way they correct other reviewable abuses of discretion-
that is, by identifying the abuse and creating an appropriate remedy. 
The remedy could include abrogating the rule until notice and com-
ment procedures have been observed, or leaving it in effect and re-
quiring postadoption procedures.176 
In many situations, it would not be an abuse of discretion for 
the agency to omit preadoption procedures even though the rule 
would have a substantial impact on the public. For example, emer-
gency conditions might require immediate action. Even if the rule 
were legislative, the agency could appropriately dispense with the 
section 553 procedure by making a "good cause" finding that they 
were "unnecessary, impracticable, or contrary to the public inter-
est."177 In such situations, the reviewing court would surely hold 
that the omission of these procedures was not an abuse of discretion. 
ill. BLURRING THE LINE BETWEEN INTERPRETIVE 
AND LEGISLATIVE RULES 
As we have seen, the APA rule-making provisions require t7nat 
courts and agencies draw a sharp distinction between interpretive 
and legislative rules. According to traditional theory, this distinr.:tion 
175. Recommendation 76-5, adopted by the Administrative Conference of the 
United States on December 9-10, 1975, is in agreement with this position. For the 
text of this and other suggestions in Recommendation 76-5, see note 266 infra. 
176. Cf. National Assn. of Independent Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 
502 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1974), in which an FCC legislative rule providing for an 
eight-month pre-effectiveness period was held arbitrary and unreasonable. A longer 
pre-effectiveness period was required, even though the AP A only sets forth a mini-
mum period of 30 days. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1970). Similarly, it might be 
argued that, although the AP A exemptions generally allow interpretive rules and 
policy statements to be adopted without any public participation, the absence of such 
procedures would be arbitrary and unreasonable when a rule is likely to have a sub-
stantial impact. 
111. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1970). 
January 1977] Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements 561 
is easily made and has a number of significant consequences. But 
recent developments of fundamental significance in administrative 
law have begun to make the distinction more difficult to draw and 
increasingly irrelevant. These developments parallel, and seem con-
sistent with, the cases that have required agencies to provide notice 
and comment procedures before adopting interpretive rules that 
have a substantial impact. 
A. The Power To Make Legislative Rules 
The expansion of agency power to promulgate legislative rules 
is a development of extraordinary importance in administrative law. 
It has left in utter shambles the comfortable notion178 that interpre-
tive and legislative rules are easy to distinguish by examination of 
an agency's rule-making power. The traditional view was that a 
legislative rule could be adopted only pursuant to a specific statutory 
delegation of authority. Rules made pursuant to general rule-
making powers were automatically deemed interpretive. Today, 
however, it is universally accepted that agencies can adopt legislative 
rules pursuant to general rule-making powers. 
For many years, the Supreme Court has been generous in its con-
struction of agency rule-making powers.179 Similarly, the agencies 
have consistently been upheld when they have adopted rules that 
circumvented adjudicatory hearings required by statute.180 The 
most striking example of the broad construction of general rule-
making powers is the case of the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC). The statute establishing the FTC contained only a gener-
al rule-making power buried among its procedural and investigatory 
provisions, 181 and for many years the agency conceded that it had 
no power to make legislative rules. Indeed, the legislative history 
of the FTC statute seemed to establish rather convincingly that Con-
gress meant to deny the FTC such power, intending that it rely solely 
on adjudication to flesh out the contours of "unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices" and "unfair methods of competition."182 Stung by crit-
icism of its ineffectiveness, the FTC finally decided that it had au-
178. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 53, at 27; Lee, 
supra note 90. 
179. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
180. See, e.g., FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); United States v. Storer 
Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). 
181. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311 § 6(g), 38 Stat. 722 (1914) (cur-: 
rent version at 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (Supp. V 1975) ). 
182. Shapiro, supra note 51, at 960. 
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thority to adopt legislative rules. 183 Judicial affirmation of this claim 
would furnish a significant procedural advantage to the Commission, 
for it could then proceed against a respondent for violation of a rule 
rather than the statute and thereby preclude relitigation of the under-
lying factual and policy basis of the rule. The FTC's power to adopt 
legislative rules was ringingly upheld by the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in National Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC, and certiorari 
was denied.184 
A similar development occurred in connection with the rule-
making of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA 
has many clear grants of legislative rule-making authority185 and also 
has a general rule-making power under section 701(a) of its organic 
statute.186 For many years, it was not clear whether section 701(a) 
conferred legislative rule-making power.187 Although the point had 
been canvassed by the lower courts, 188 the Supreme Court, in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Gardner, 189 seemed to assume that regulations 
adopted under section 701(a) were legislative, and passed on to its 
landmark analysis of ripeness. Recently, the Second Circuit 
squarely confronted the issue.190 It noted that attempts to draw a 
hard and fast line between legislative and interpretive regulations 
had been rather unrewarding because the line of demarcation is far 
from clear. But the court recognized that if the administrative proc-
183. Earlier, the FfC' had adopted a middle course. In the famous cigarette 
labeling opinion in 1964, the FfC investigated the economics of the tobacco industry 
and the hazards of smoking. It adopted an interpretive rule requiring health warn-
ings, and declared that it would take official notice of the results of its investigation 
in subsequent adjudications against noncomplying cigarette manufacturers. See 29 
Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964). However, there was doubt whether the FfC could preclude 
relitigation of the factual bases of its interpretive rule. See K. DAVIS, supra note 51, 
§ 5.04, at 258-63 (Supp. 1970); Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: 
Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Re-
form, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 491-96 (1970); Shapiro, supra note 51, at 964-68. 
184. National Petroleum Refiners Assn. v. FfC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). 
185. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1970). 
186. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 701(a), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (a) 
( 1970). 
187. See Forte, The GMP Regulations and the Proper Scope of FDA Rulemaki11g 
Authority, 56 GEO. L.J. 688 (1968). See generally Cody, Authoritative Effect of 
FDA Regulations, 24 FOOD, DRUG & COSMETICS L.J. 195 (1969); Shapiro, supra note 
51, at 967-71. 
188. See Abbott Laboratories v. Celebreeze, 352 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1965), revd., 
387 U.S. 136 (1967) (regulations held to be interpretive); Toilet Goods Assn. v. 
Gardner, 360 F.2d 677, 686-87 (2d Cir. 1966), affd., 387 U.S. 158, 167 (1967) (ir-
relevant whether regulations are deemed interpretive or legislative). 
189. 387 U.S. 136, 151-52 (1967). 
190. National Nutritional Foods Assn. v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
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ess is to be effective, specific regulations under general statutory 
delegations of power have to be treated as authoritative, regardless 
of whether they are labelled legislative or interpretive, especially in 
areas where the agency possesses expertise not shared by the courts. 
Where once it might have demanded proof of specific delegation of 
legislative rule-making authority, the court stated that it had learned 
from experience to accept a general delegation of power as sufficient 
in certain areas of expertise.101 
In light of this trend, a theoretical distinction between legislative 
and interpretive rules assumed to be present by Congress when it 
approved the AP A has been effectively erased. It would appear 
that any agency having a general rule-making power can successfully 
assert the power to adopt legislative regulations after notice and com-
ment procedures, and thus take advantage of the truncated adjudi-
cations and narrowly circumscribed judicial review that attend legis-
lative rules. 
B. Scope of Review 
There exists a fundamental difference in the scope of judicial 
review accorded legislative and interpretive rules. Indeed, one 
reason the AP A exempted interpretive rules from the preadoption 
requirements was that such rules were thought to be subject to 
plenary judicial review.192 As Congress understood the difference 
in 1946, interpretive rules were simply the agency's legal opinion, 
as to which a court was free to substitute its judgment. Legislative 
rules, on the other hand, were upheld if they were not arbitrary or 
capricious and were rationally related to the purpose of the under-
lying statute.103 If the validity of a regulation depended upon fac-
tual premises, the presumption of regularity required the court to 
assume facts supporting the regulation.194 
Recent developments have sharply narrowed the gap between 
the intensity of judicial review accorded legislative rules and that ac-
corded interpretive rules. In the case of legislative rules, the verbal 
formulation of the scope of the review has not changed, 195 but the 
actual scrutiny has become far more searching. This is not the place 
191. See 512 F.2d at 696. 
192. See note 55 supra. 
193. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 53, at 115-20; 
F. VoM BAUR, supra note 90, at 489. This remains the standard today under section 
706(2)(A) of the Act. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv. Inc., 411 
U.S. 356, 369 (1973). 
194. See, e.g., Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935). 
195. See note 193 supra. 
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for an extended discussion of this trend, but a sketch of some recent 
developments is illuminating.196 No longer are factual premises 
always assumed to support the agency's policy decision. On the con-
trary, the whole record is rigorously examined to see whether they 
do. 197 Under various verbal formulations, such as "clear error of 
judgment,"198 the "hard look doctrine,"190 or the requirement of 
"principled decision-making,"200 the rule must be a justifiable exer-
cise of the agency's discretion. The agency must consider the com-
ments directed toward it201 and must disclose and permit scrutiny 
of its methodology. 202 Various procedural innovations have been 
imposed on the agency to improve its decisionmaking and to facil-
itate review.203 Its notice to the public must adequately alert those 
with an interest at stake. 204 Its statement of basis and purpose has 
to provide a comprehensive explanation of its reasoning. 205 The 
196. See K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 646-87. 
197. See, e.g., Hooker Chem. & Plastic Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 
1976); City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U.S. 1074 (1972). The court in the latter case specifically argued that the scope 
of review of legislative regulations had to be searching so that the agency would not 
be rewarded for casting its lawmaking in the form of rules rather than adjudications. 
See generally Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: 
The Quest for the Optimum Forum, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 39-52 (1975); Pedersen, 
Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38 (1975); Verkuil, supra 
note 80. 
198. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 
(1971); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 507 (4th Cir. 1973). 
199. Portland Cement Assn. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). 
200. O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974); International Har-
vester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., con-
curring); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). 
201. See Rodway v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 814 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975), noted in 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 402 (1975). 
202. See Portland Cement Assn. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 
1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 643 (D.C. Cir. 
1973 ). 
203. See Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Mobil 
Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International Harvester 
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co. 
v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 501 (4th Cir. 1973); Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 
U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1305-15 (1975); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV, 
401, 425-26 (1975); Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements 
for Agency Rulemaking, 81 HARv. L. REV. 782, 782-83 (1974). 
204. See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 
S. Ct. 2224 (1976); Rodway v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 
814-15 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019-20 (3d 
Cir. 1972). 
205. See National Assn. of Food Chains, Inc. v. ICC, 535 F.2d 1308, 1314 (D.C. 
Cir, 1976); Amoco Oil Co. v, EPA, 501 F,2d 722, 739 (D.C, Cir. 1974); Rodway 
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agency can be compelled to clarify the portions of the rule that 
the court considers too vague.206 Finally, the statute and its legis-
lative history are closely and critically scrutinized in order to ascer-
tain whether the regulation is truly a reasonable implementation of 
the statutory design. 201 Surely, this intensification of judicial re-
view of legislative regulations is a development in administrative 
law of fundamental significance. 
At the same time, the judicial review accorded interpretive 
regulations is far less intense than traditional statements about 
substitution of judgment would indicate. 208 In fact, the courts 
nearly always defer to interpretive regulations and to an agency's 
interpretation of its own regulations. 209 Indeed, the standard of ju-
dicial review is sometimes stated in terms of whether a rule reason-
ably implements the statute---exactly the same test accorded legis-
lative rules.21° Consider, for example, this wholly typical quotation, 
from a case involving a rule relating to administration of the public 
land laws: 
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court 
shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the 
officers or agency charged with its administration. "To sustain the 
Commission's application of this statutory term, we need not find 
that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is 
the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the 
first instance in judicial proceedings." . . . When the construc-
tion of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is in issue, 
deference is even more clearly in order. 
. . . If therefore, the Secretary's interpretation is not unreasonable, 
if the language of the orders bears his construction, we must reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals.211 
v. United States Dept of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Citizens Assn. 
v. Zoning Commn., 477 F.2d 402,408 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
206. See Hooker Chem. & Plastic Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 633, 639 (2d Cir. 
1976); National Assn. of Independent Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 516 
F.2d 526, 539, 541 (2d Cir. 1975). 
207. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 213-29 (1973); Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 379-86 (1969); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 8-
11 (1965). When constitutional issues are implicated, the court's scrutiny of the 
statutory basis for a regulation is particularly strict. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong, 422 U.S. 88, 105-14 (1976). 
208. See note 55 supra. 
209. See, e.g., Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter, 423 
U.S. 12 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Bowles 
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945); Gueory v. Hampton, 
510 F.2d 1222, 1223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 
F.2d 971, 977 (5th Cir. 1974). 
210. Much the same result is achieved by treating agency interpretations as ques-
tions of fact reviewable under the reasonableness approach of the substantial evidence 
test. See, e.g., NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 269 (1956). 
211. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1965) (emphasis added). In tax 
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Of course, interpretive rules are occasionally subjected to plenary re-
view and sometimes invalidated by the courts. But generally it ap-
pears likely that those regulations would have been equally invalid 
if they had been legislative212 because the invalidity of the rule 
seems conclusively mandated by the legislative history and policy.213 
Courts seldom employ the sort of free-wheeling substitution of judg-
ment that the traditional model permits. 
There are a number of factors that are generally considered 
important in assessing the degree of deference that should be ac-
corded an interpretive rule. 214 Among other factors, 210 an inter-
pretive rule is more likely to be considered valid if it has been long-
standing, was contemporaneous with the adoption of the statute, has 
been consistently adhered to, or has been called to the attention of 
Congress which approved it or reenacted the statute without change. 
The fact that courts frequently focus on these criteria might suggest 
that the process of review of interpretive rules is fundamentally dif-
ferent from the review accorded legislative rules, where these factors 
are not expressly employed. But many of these factors are, in fact, 
quite relevant in determining the validity of a legislative regulation 
that might or might not reasonably implement the statutory de-
sign. 216 Further, many of the factors seem to be used as make-
weights: Having decided whether the interpretive regulation is valid, 
the court mentions all the factors it can muster that tend to support 
its decision. 217 
cases, the courts also uphold interpretive rules if they implement the statute "in some 
reasonable manner." United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967). See Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 528, 532 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (legislative 
tax regulation seemingly given same scope of review as interpretive regulations). BIii 
see Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 329 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1964) (special 
deference to legislative tax rule). 
212. See H.M. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 1320 (Tent. ed. 1958) (un-
published), which suggests that the task of statutory construction is the same whether 
an interpretive or legislative rule is being reviewed. 
213. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86 (1974); United States 
v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973); Wilderness Socy. v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973); Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th 
Cir. 1969). 
214. For a comprehensive discussion see 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 51, §§ 5.05-5.07, 
at 314-38. 
215. In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the Court considered 
whether the interpretation was made in the course of the administrator's official 
duties, whether it was based upon specialized experience and broad information and 
investigation, the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reason-
ing, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and "all those factors 
which gave it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 323 U.S. at 140. 
216. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 51, § 5.06, at 329. 
211. See, e.g., Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428 (1941). 
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Although the techniques of reviewing interpretive and legislative 
rules are converging, it would be undesirable if the differences were 
wholly to disappear. Interpretations, after all, take many forms. 
Some are carefully considered interpretive rules published in the 
Federal Register, or closely reasoned legal conclusions reached in 
formal adjudications. But other interpretations, such as advice 
letters in response to inquiries from the public, generally receive 
much less thoughtful analysis from the agency staff. In reviewing 
various interpretive material, the courts should not be limited to the 
narrow scope of review applicable to a legislative rule. Instead, they 
should retain their power to substitute judgment on issues of law, 
giving deference to the administrative interpretation when appropri-
ate, but substituting judgment when the court's superior ability in 
statutory construction or its broader policy perspective is called 
for. 218 Nevertheless, the evolution in the intensity of judicial review 
of both interpretive and legislative rules has seriously undermined 
the judgment of the APA's draftsmen that the public should be ex-
cluded from interpretive rulemaking because the rules receive ple-
nary judicial review. 
C. Ripeness 
Another important development in contemporary administrative 
law is the increasing availability of judicial review of rules prior to 
their enforcement in adjudication. 219 There is authority for the view 
that interpretations generally, and interpretive rules in particular, are 
not ripe 'for preenforcement review.220 Much of this authority, how-
ever, predates the Supreme Court's landmark analysis of ripeness in 
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,221 which contributed greatly to the 
withering away of the ripeness doctrine as an obstacle to preenforce-
ment review of administrative rules. Under the Abbott Laboratories 
standard, the ripeness of agency action depends on the degree of prac-
tical harm to plaintiff from a delay in review, the fitness of the issues 
for immediate review, and the injury to the public from immediate re-
218. However, if the public has participated in making the rule,_ and the agency 
appears to have considered carefully the input it received from the public, the rule 
might appropriately be given considerable deference by a reviewing court. 
219. See generally Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness 
in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1443 (1971). 
220. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Celebrezze, 352,F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1965), 
revd. on other grounds, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (interpretive rule); American President 
Lines, Ltd. v. FMC, 316 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (interpretive rule); Helco Prods. 
v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 671 (1943) (advisory 
letter). 
221. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
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view. 222 Applying the Abbott Laboratories analysis, the courts have 
found that interpretive rules, 223 as well as policy statements2:i4 and 
all sorts of informal agency action, 225 are susceptible to immediate 
judicial review. For example, the District of Columbia Circuit held 
the revenue ruling in the Eastern Kentucky case to be interpretive 
but nevertheless reviewed it before it was applied.226 Similarly, in 
National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz,221 an 
opinion letter from the agency head to a trade association was held 
ripe for review. 
Interpretive rules, as well as policy statements, will be frequently 
unripe for preenforcement review228 because the practical harm 
caused by an interpretive rule is often less serious than that caused 
by a legislative rule. But Eastern Kentucky and National Automatic 
Laundry, among other cases, illustrate that interpretive rules can 
cause immediate practical harm that justifies immediate review. 220 
Further, interpretive rules adopted without public participation may 
not be suitable for review because of the lack of a record. 230 This 
shortcoming is not conclusive, however, since some regulations 
222. 387 U.S. at 148-56. 
223. See, e.g., Frozen Foods Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956); Inde-
pendent Bankers Assn. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Toilet Goods Assn. 
v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966), affd. on other grounds, 381 U.S. 158, 167 
(1967); Gordon v. Federal Reserve Sys., 317 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Mass. 1970). For 
the view that Frozen Foods involved preenforcement review of an interpretive rule, 
see M. AsIMOW, supra note 88, at 115-17; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMIN· 
ISTRATIVE ACTION 405-06 (1965); Vining, supra note 219, at 1463 n.73. See also 
National Assn. of Ins. Agents v. Federal Reserve Sys., 489 F.2d 1268, 1271 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968), in which the court, although acknowledging that interpretive rules arc 
usually unreviewable, indicated that a strong showing of immediate and inescapable 
effect might -permit preenforcement review. 
224. E.g., Continental Air Lines v. CAB, 522 F.2d 107, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1915); 
Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
225. E.g., Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Assn. v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971) (seemingly cited with approval in Gordon 
v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 690 n.15 (1975)); Medical Comm. for 
Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 
403 (1972); Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Environmental Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
226. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 
1974), revd. on other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976). However, in a dissenting 
opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the ruling was not ripe for review. See 96 S. Ct. 
at 1928. 
227. 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
228. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Con-
tinental Oil Co. v. Bums, 317 F. Supp. 194 (D. Del. 1970). 
229. For a discussion of the practical harm caused by informal SEC action, see 
Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Assn. v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
230. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 39-40 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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present strictly legal issues and can be reviewed without a record;231 
in other cases, the court could remand to the agency for the purposes 
of building a record. 232 
The fact that interpretive rules are susceptible to preenforcement 
judicial review has a significant bearing on the issue of public partici-
pation. First, the decline of the ripeness doctrine marks the end 
of yet another characteristic of interpretive rules traditionally as-
sumed to distinguish them from legislative rules. Second, the record 
produced would help the courts gauge more accurately the practical 
impact of the rule and thus the need for preenforcement judicial re-
view. Finally, the existence of a record facilitates substantive review 
of the rule. The public's comments, and the agency's response to 
them in its concise statement of basis and purpose, are of great value 
to'the reviewing court. Even though the court frequently defers to 
the agency's policy judgment, the existence of a record tends to as-
sure the court that the agency has thoroughly considered all aspects 
of the rule. 
D. Retroactivity 
Another traditional difference between legislative and interpre-
tive regulations is that legislative rules are generally prospective in 
application233 while interpretive rules are frequently retroactive. 234 
The theory was that a statute or legislative rule states the law; the 
interpretive rule simply clarifies law that has existed all along. 
This distinction is still meaningful, but the difference is less 
significant than the theory would suggest. First, legislative regula-
tions are often retroactive, either in their practical or their legal ef-
fect. For example, a prospective legislative rule can destroy busi-
ness relationships that had been established in reliance on prior 
law. 235 Moreover, like statutes, 236 explicitly retroactive legislative 
regulations occasionally are valid. Thus in Addison v. Holly Hill 
231. Surely, all legislative rules adopted without public participation because of 
the military and foreign affairs exemption and proprietary functions exemption, 5 
U.S.C. § 553(a) (1)-(2) (1970), are not immune from preenforcement review. 
232. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970). 
233. See Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964); Arizona Grocery 
Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932). 
234. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965). 
235. See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 
5i1)4 F.2d 646, 678 (1st Cir. 1974); Robinson, supra note 183, at 517-18; Shapiro, 
s11pra note 51, at 933-34. 
236. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 96 S. Ct. 2822 (1976). 
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Fruit Products Co., 237 an originally promulgated regulation had been 
found invalid and a replacement was adopted. Under these circum-
stances, the replacement regulation could be retroactive. In Thorpe 
v. Housing Authority,238 the Supreme Court held that new regula-
tions requiring notice and procedural protections for tenants evicted 
from public housing must be applied retroactively by the local 
housing authority to evictions occurring before they were adopted. 
Still, these cases are exceptional; generally, agencies do not seek to 
make their legislative regulations retroactive. 
In accordance with traditional theory, interpretive regulations, 
like decisions reached in adjudication, can legally be retroactive.238 
However, it seems reasonably clear that an agency can choose to 
make an interpretive rule prospective only, 240 and many of them 
have done so. 241 Indeed, the definition of "rule" in the AP A strongly 
suggests that all rules, interpretive and legislative, should be of 
"future effect,"242 and new interpretations are explicitly required to 
be prospective by statutes applicable to the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, and the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of 
Labor. 243 Courts may construe an ambiguous interpretation to have 
237. 322 U.S. 607 (1944). More frequently, the courts deal with this situation 
by ordering the invalidly adopted regulations to remain in effect until new ones can 
be adopted. See, e.g., Rodway v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 
817 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
238. 393 U.S. 268 (1969). See Maceren v. INS, 509 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1974); 
General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971); Certified Color 
Indus. Comm. v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1960); Steert v. Morgenthau, 116 
F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir. 1940). See generally Note, Retroactive Operation of Admin-
istrative Regulations, 60 HARV. L. REV. 627 (1947). 
239. See United States v. Zenith-Godley Co., 180 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), 
alfd. per curiam, 295 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1961). 
240. See Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Lyons, 7 Ill. 2d 95, 104-05, 129 N.E.2d 765, 
770 (1955); 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 51, § 5.09; Note, supra note 238, at 633-34. 
Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90 (1939), can be interpreted as approving 
a prospective rule. Still, it is not definitely settled that interpretive rules can be con-
fined to prospective application. See Baird, supra note 161; Berger, Estoppel Against 
the Government, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 680, 698-707 (1954). 
241. See generally M. AsIMow, supra note 88, at 7-8, 30-31; Baird, supra note 
161. 
242. 5 u.s.c. § 551(4) (1970). 
243. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1970); 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (Supp. V 1975) 
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970) ); Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 775(a) (1970); Wage & Hour Division Act, 29 U.S.C. § 259 (1970). These statutes 
protect persons relying on interpretations from retroactive changes. See generally 
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973); M. AsIMOW, 
supra note 88, at 30, 147, 185-86. Section 7805(b) of the Internal Revenue Code 
authorizes the IRS to make all interpretations prospective. Under this statute 
retroactive interpretations can be set aside as an abuse of discretion. See 
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exclusively prospective effect, 244 and, according to the Supreme 
Court, an interpretive regulation can create a reliance interest that 
precludes a criminal prosecution for violation of the statute. 245 
Another inhibition to retroactive changes in interpretive rules is 
the principle that the agency is bound by its own rules. It cannot 
depart from them in individual cases.246 Although this doctrine 
usually is applied to procedural provisions, it seems equally appli-
cable to interpretive rules. 247 
Yet another barrier to retroactive changes in interpretive rules 
are the doctrines of equitable estoppel and apparent authority. 
Slowly but surely, these private law rules are becoming applicable 
in actions against the government. Although strong Supreme Court 
authority stands against this trend, 248 the lower courts on numerous 
occasions have found ways to circumvent this authority in order to 
prevent retroactive changes in position by the government from dis-
turbing well-founded reliance interests. 249 The principles of estop-
pel and apparent authority probably will most frequently be appli-
cable to cases of individual advice by the agency, rather than to inter-
pretations of general applicability, since courts might be reluctant to 
extend an estoppel to an unpredictably large group of persons. But 
estoppel and apparent authority issues are equitable notions; their 
application depends on a comparison of the detriment to the plain-
tiffs from enforcing the rule with the harm to the public from en-
joining it. If the equities demand it, a court could easily hold that 
the government abused its discretion by making, or was estopped 
to make, a retroactive change in an interpretive rule of general appli-
cability. 
Chock Full O' Nuts Corp. v. United States, 453 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1971). See gen-
erally Lynn & Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of Discretion as Applied Against 
the United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 TAX. L. REv. 487 (1964); Com-
ment, Limits on Retroactive Decision Making by the Internal Revenue Service: Re-
defining Abuse of Discretion Under Section 7805(b), 23 U.C.L.A. L.REv. 528 (1976). 
244. See, e.g., Crespo v. United States, 399 F.2d 191 (Ct. Cl. 1968). 
245. See United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Co., 411 U.S. 655 (1973). 
246. See Gardner v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1086, 1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
247. See, e.g., Vogt v. United States, 537 F.2d 405, 412-13 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Nader 
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commn., 513 F.2d 1045, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Distrigas of 
Mass. Corp. v. FPC, 517 F.2d 761, 765 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Ewig Bros. 
Co., 502 F.2d 715, 725 n.34 (7th Cir. 1974). But see Brennan v. Ace Hardware 
Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974) (guidelines in manual not binding on agency); 
Davis, Administrative Law -Surprises in the Ruiz Case, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 823, 840 
(1975). Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-96 (1976). 
248. See M. As1MoW, supra note 88, at 33-37. 
249. See United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975); M. ASIMOW, 
supra note 88, at 37-59; Asimow, Estoppel Against the Government: The Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, 2 CHICANO L. REv. 4 (1975). 
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Moreover, it seems clear that retroactive changes in the law re-
sulting from adjudication may be set aside as an abuse of discretion. 
As explained in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,250 a retroactive adjudicatory 
change might be invalidated if the damage to reliance interests out-
weighed the mischief of allowing a particular case to escape the ad-
ministrative clutches. Recently, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace,2ri1 the 
Supreme Court permitted a retroactive change resulting from adjudi-
cation, but made it clear that such changes are not always permis-
sible. Lower courts have occasionally set aside retroactive changes 
reached through adjudication.252 If retroactive changes resulting from 
adjudication can be an abuse of discretion, it surely is clear that re-
troactive changes in interpretive rules can also be set aside.253 
E. Waivers of Legislative Rules 
It is often said that the effect of interpretive and legislative rules 
differs when they are applied in subsequent adjudication. If the 
rule is legislative, the agency applies the rule. If the rule is interpre-
tive, the agency applies the statute. This distinction is significant, 
but once again its importance can easily be overstated. 
When a legislative rule is applied in adjudication, an agency must 
permit parties to petition for a waiver of the rule.254 This means 
that the agency must consider whether it is appropriate to apply the 
rule in the particular case. Similarly, when an interpretive rule is 
applicable in an adjudication, the agency must decide whether to 
follow the rule, find it inapplicable to the particular case, or even 
revoke it. In practical terms, therefore, this difference between 
legislative and interpretive rules is more illusory than real. In each 
case, the agency will probably apply its rule to the parties before 
it, but the agency must first consider whether application of either 
a legislative or an interpretive rules is inappropriate. 
250. 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
251. 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974). 
252. See, e.g., NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966); 
NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952). See generally Berger, 
Retroactive Administrative Decisions, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 371 (1967). 
253. It is somewhat anomalous, therefore, that law changes made in adjudications 
probably cannot be made prospective only. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 
U.S. 759, 774-75 (1969). Evidently, changes in policy, if they are to be prospective, 
must come through rulemaking. 
254. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); United 
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956); Southwest Pa. Cable 
Television, Inc. v. FCC, 514 F.2d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Claggett, Informal 
Action-Adjudication-RUlemaking: Some Recent Developments in Federal Ad-
ministrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51; Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through 
Rulemaking, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 781,804 (1965). 
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F. Summary 
There remains a fundamental difference between legislative and in-
terpretive rules. Legislative rules are made pursuant to delegated 
legislative power, but interpretive rules represent the agency's view 
of the meaning of the law. Notwithstanding this clear conceptual dif-
ference, much has occurred since 1946 to make the distinction be-
tween legislative and interpretive rules extremely blurry and, in many 
situations, downright unnecessary. Since legislative rule-making 
powers are broadly construed, many regulations once thought to be 
interpretive are now legislative. The formerly clear differences with 
respect to intensity of judicial review, ripeness, and retroactivity have 
sharply narrowed. Since these traditional barriers are crumbling, it 
should not be surprising that the courts have begun to erase still 
another line by requiring notice and comment procedures before the 
adoption of what traditionally would have been considered interpre-
tive rules. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR POSTADOPTION PROCEDURES 
FOR NONLEGISLATIVE RULES 
As we have seen, the courts have repeatedly dealt with claims 
that the public should be entitled to participate in the making of 
interpretive rules and policy statements. The resolution of these 
claims has been unsatisfactory. Under the legal effect test, the re-
sults are relatively predictable, but the courts have been oblivious 
to the public's need to take part in the formulation of many rules. 
Under the substantial impact test, the courts have been attentive to 
the needs of the public, but the results have been unpredictable and 
the conceptual basis of the decisions unclear. The problem thus 
seems resistant to solution by ad hoc judicial decisions. Conse-
quently, it seems worthwhile to consider whether the problem might 
better be resolved through congressional amendment of the AP A. 
Before turning to an evaluation of proposed statutory changes, it is 
helpful to summarize the values of public participation in rule-
making. 
A. The Importance of Public Participation in Rulemaking 
The AP A introduced the concept of mandatory public partici-
pation in federal rulemaking. The concept of notice and comment 
procedure is widely accepted as a truly progressive contribution to 
better government. 2~5 The advantages of public participation in 
255. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 61, at 65-68. 
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rulemaking have been enumerated so often that there is little need 
for this article to dwell on them in great detail. 256 
The primary reason that public participation leads to better rules 
is that it provides a channel through which the agency can receive 
needed education. Agencies are not omniscient and do not have 
all relevant economic and social data. They cannot anticipate all of 
the consequences and problems that will flow from the adoption of 
their rules. This sort of data is obtained by requiring the agency 
to solicit and consider public comments. The interviews conducted 
in connection with this study repeatedly indicated the practical value 
that agency personnel attach to public commentary, including that 
obtained in the course of adopting interpretive rules and policy state-
ments. Public input also contributes to better rulemaking by off-
setting institutional biases that may exist in favor of or against the 
regulated group. Moreover, the public may be more likely to accept 
and less likely to sabotage a rule if it has been allowed to participate 
in its formulation. 2117 
Public participation in rulemaking also has values that transcend 
these instrumental ones. In our system of representative govern-
ment, participation in governmental decisionmaking by persons af-
fected by it is an affirmative good. This is particularly true in the case 
of administrative agencies, which are not as politically responsive as 
the legislature or the executive. Although theoretically subject to a 
variety of legislative, executive, and judicial controls, most agency 
action, and particularly rulemaking, is not supervised at aU.2GB 
Agencies make laws affecting many interests behind closed doors; 
their impartiality and freedom from pressures are frequently ques-
tioned. 259 Notice and comment procedures in rulemaking are ide-
ally tailored to increase the responsiveness of the agency and to 
facilitate democratic participation. They permit public participation 
at a critical moment in administration when law and policy are about 
256. See Bonfield, supra note 94, at 540-42; Cramton, The Why, Where and How 
of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 
527-32 (1972); Comment, Due Process Rights of Participation ~n Administrative 
Rulemaking, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 886, 893-98 (1975). But see Koch, supra note 9, 
at 1077-78. 
257. For example, the parole board, while it did not find comments from prison-
ers particularly helpful in developing parole guidelines, indicated that the prisoners' 
participation in formulating guidelines made the guidelines more acceptable to them. 
258. See Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 
1395 (1975). 
259. In response to this concern, the House Judiciary Committee, during the 94th 
Congress introduced a bill that would require congressional scrutiny of regulations 
before they become effective. H.R. 12048, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 1280 
(1976). However, the bill was rejected in the House. 
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to crystallize, and they provide a powerful tool by which persons who 
will be adversely or favorably affected by agency action can seek to 
influence that action in an open fashion. 
Public participation is no less necessary in the formulation of in-
terpretive rules and policy statements than in legislative rulemaking. 
The agency is as much in need of information when it interprets its 
law or regulations, or when it formulates guidelines for exercising its 
discretion, as it is when it imposes binding norms on the public. 260 As 
we have seen, the impact of many interpretations or policy state-
ments can be as great as that of legislative rules. And the demo-
cratic values of public participation are as well served by requiring 
preadoption procedures in the formulation of nonlegislative rules as 
in the formulation of legislative rules. Consequently, if the problem 
is to be left to judicial resolution, I favor the use of the substantial 
impact test, despite its uncertainty of application. However, perhaps 
the best solution lies in congressional amendment of the AP A, a 
possibility that will now be considered. 
B. Repeal of the Exemption 
One obvious statutory solution entails repeal of the exemption 
for nonlegislative rules from the AP A. This would open the process 
to public participation and eliminate the need to distinguish between 
legislative and nonlegislative rules. This proposal is ill-advised, 
however, since two of the reasons for originally adopting the exemp-
tion .still seem persuasive. The AP A draftsmen wished to encourage 
the adoption of interpretive rules and policy statements by not re-
quiring burdensome procedures. They were also concerned by 
the inappropriateness of mandating a single, rigid procedure for the 
many forms that nonlegislative rulemaking may take. 261 
Interviews with many agency personnel indicate nearly unani-
mous opposition to expansion of preadoption procedures to all in-
terpretive rules and policy statements. This opposition is similar to 
260. See Popkin, A Critique of the Rule-Making Process in Federal Income Tax 
Law With Special Reference to Conglomerate Acquisitions, 45 IND. L.J. 453, 492-
513 (1970) (criticism of IRS published rulings). 
261. The Senate Judiciary Committee staff wrote: 
First, it is desired to encourage the making of such rules. Secondly, those types 
of rules vary so greatly in their contents and the occasion for their issuance that 
it seems wise to leave the matter of notice and public procedures to the discre-
tion of the agencies concerned. Thirdly, the provision for petitions contained 
in subsection (c) affords an opportunity for private parties to secure a reconsid-
eration of such rules when issued. Another reason, which might be added, is 
that 'interpretative' rules-as merely interpretations of statutory provisions--are 
subject to plenary judicial review, whereas 'substantive' rules involve a maximum 
of administrative discretion. 
APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 55, at 18. 
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that voiced when Congress contemplated repeal of the exemptions 
in the 1960's and to objections eloquently expressed by Professors 
Kenneth Davis and Arthur Bonfield.262 
The objections to an extension of notice and comment pro-
cedures focus on a comparison of the proposal's costs and benefits. 
One significant cost is that the proposal will substantially delay adop-
tion of nonlegislative rules. As a practical matter, it is difficult to 
nurse a controversial rule through the statutory procedures in less 
than six months to a year. During that period, there is uncertainty 
about whether the new rule will be adopted, and a less desirable 
interpretation or policy may remain in effect. A second cost is the 
substantial increase in workload that will result from a good faith 
evaluation of a large volume of public comments. For example, or-
ganized letter-writing campaigns occasionally swamp the agency. 
These burdens may divert agency personnel from more worthwhile 
tasks. A third, related cost is that the agency may decide that non-
legislative rulemaking is not worth the trouble. It might simply re-
fuse to adopt the interpretation or policy and instead deal with 
the particular problem through case-by-case adjudication, private ad-
vice letters, individual contacts with the public, or informal internal 
communication. This would deny the public the benefit of a gen-
erally applicable and well-publicized rule. If legislation seriously 
inhibited the adoption of interpretive rules and policy statements, it 
would not serve the public interest. 
These problems are particularly acute in agencies that issue sub-
stantial numbers of interpretations and policy statements. Consider, 
for example, the operations instructions of the Immigration Service 
or multi-volume staff manuals of the Internal Revenue Service or Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration. Many items that could 
be considered interpretations of general applicability or general policy 
statements are mixed in with merely procedural instructions. If the 
agency were required to follow public notice and comment procedures 
262. Professor Davis, expressing his opposition to the proposed legislation in tes-
timony before Congress, argued that it would discourage the adoption of interpretive 
rules and policy statements. See Administrative Procedure: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 150, 174 (1965). For the views of Professor Bonfield, 
see Bonfield, supra note 9. Interestingly, Professor Bonfield favored the elimination 
of exemptions under the Iowa statute. See Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Proce-
dure Act: Background, Construction, Applicability, Public Access to Agency Law, The 
Rulemaking Process, 60 IowA L. REV. 731, 858-60 (1975). Professor Bonfield indi-
cated that his change of position was motivated partly by a desire to see whether 
the agencies would in fact substitute adjudication for rulemaking. Moreover, he 
noted that the Iowa legislators were unalterably opposed to the exemption. Letter 
from Arthur Bonfield to Michael Asimow (August 26, 1975). 
January 1977] Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements 577 
each time it wanted to amend its manual, its operations would be 
seriously rigidified. 
The benefits attending such a vast expansion of preadoption pro-
cedures would be slight. In all likelihood, the vast majority of inter-
pretations and policy statements would elicit no public interest at all. 
They would be either obviously correct, trivial in importance, or ut-
terly noncontroversial. Some nonlegislative rules, of course, are 
quite important and would generate significant commentary; such 
commentary could well result in the modification of some rules. 
From the point of view of both the public and the agency, however, 
the costs seem clearly to outweigh the benefits of requiring preadop-
tion procedures for all nonlegislative rules. 
One response to these arguments, however, is that an agency can 
eliminate some or all of the procedures for rulemaking if it finds 
in good faith that such procedures are "unnecessary, impracticable, 
or contrary to the public interest."263 By making this finding, the 
agency could dispense with required notice and comment when the 
rule is trivial or when it must be made effective immediately. Yet 
the good cause exemption is not a complete answer to the problem, 
since an issue of whether the agency had abused its discretion would 
be raised each time the exemption was claimed. 264 An obstruction-
ist litigating strategy would be open to anyone aggrieved by the 
rule, 265 and the uncertainty of whether the good cause exemption was 
proper might itself inhibit its use. 
On the other hand, there might well be such massive utilization 
263. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (B), 553(d) (3) (1970). See generally Bonfield, 71 
MICH. L. REV. 222, supra note 94, at 291-315; Bonfield, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 
supra note 94, at 588-608. 
264. Generally, courts have upheld good cause findings. -See, e.g., Nader v. Saw-
hill, 514 F.2d 1034 (Erner. Ct. App. 1975); Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455, 458 
(Erner. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975); De Rieux v. Five Smiths, 
Inc., 499 F.2d 1321, 1322 (Erner. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975); 
Durkin v. Edward S. Wagner Co., 115 F. Supp. 118, 121-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), affd. 
sub nom. Mitchell v. Edward S. Wagner Co., 217 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. 
denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955). However, good cause findings have also been rejected, 
either because they were not explicit or the court disagreed with the agency's reason-
ing. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. EPA, 496 F.2d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 1974); 
Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1969); American College of Neuro-
psychopharmacology v. Weinberger, No. 75-1187 (D.D.C. July 3, 1975); New York 
v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Kelly v. Interior Dept., 339 
F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 1972). 
265. But see Koch, supra note 9, at 1057. Professor Koch's view that the overall 
amount of litigation would not be increased since procedural challenges would simply 
be appended to substantive challenges to the rules is not persuasive. Many inter-
pretive rules and policy statements are not ripe for immediate substantive review, see 
text at notes 219-32 supra, but would be ripe for procedural challenges. Moreover, 
many rules, which would not be challenged on substantive grounds, would be subject 
to attack on procedural grounds because the likelihood of success is greater. Thus, 
increased litigation would result. 
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of the good cause exemption that its use would become mechanical. 
Consequently, the public might, in the end, be invited to participate 
in the making of very few interpretive rules and policy statements. 
Thus, by employing the good cause exemption, the agencies could 
probably avoid the costs of public participation in their rule-making 
processes, but only by returning to a pattern of exclusion that the re-
form was designed to remedy in the first place. 
C. Postadoption Notice and Comment 
This article recommends that Congress amend the AP A to re-
quire postadoption public participation for nonlegislative rules.200 
Under the recommended procedure, the agency could issue, amend, 
or repeal its interpretive rules of general applicability and general 
policy statements without giving any prior notice, allowing the 
public to comment prior to adoption, or delaying the rule's effective-
ness for a specified period.267 However, publication of the rule in the 
Federal Register or some other generally available form, like the 
266. This proposal has been approved in substance by the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States in Recommendation 76-5. This recommendation, addressed 
to the agencies rather than Congress, suggests that postadoption commentary would 
be good practice but does not suggest that the Act be amended: 
1. Before an agency issues, amends, or repeals an interpretive rule of general 
applicability or a statement of general policy which is likely to have substantial 
impact on the public, the agency normally should utilize the procedures set forth 
in Administrative Procedure Act subsections 553(b) and (c), by publishing the 
proposed interpretive rule or policy statement in the Federal Register, with a 
concise statement of its basis and purpose and an invitation to interested persons 
to submit written comments, with or without opportunity for oral presentation. 
If it is impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest to use such 
procedures the agency should so state in the interpretive rule or policy statement, 
with a brief statement of the reasons therefor. 
2. Where there has been no pre-promulgation notice and opportunity for 
comment the publication of an interpretive rule of general applicability or a 
statement of general policy, even one made effective immediately, should include 
a statement of its basis and purpose and an invitation to interested persons to 
submit written comments, with or without opportunity for oral presentation, 
within a following period of not less than thirty days. The agency should eval-
uate the rule or statement in the light of comments received. Not later than 
sixty days after the close of the comment period, the agency should indicate in 
the Federal Register its adherence to or alteration of its previous action, respond-
ing as may be appropriate to significant comments received. An agency may 
omit these post-adoption comment procedures when it incorporates in the in-
terpretive rule or policy statement a declaration, with a brief statement of rea-
sons, that such procedures would serve no public interest or would be so burden-
some as to outweigh any foreseeable gain. 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF 'IHE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 76-5 (Dec. 
10, 1976). 
267. For a similar proposal, see L. WRIGHT, NEEDED CHANGES IN IRS CoNFL1CT 
REsoLUTION PROCEDURES 67-68 (1971). The procedure has occasionally been em-
ployed by the agencies. See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 30,936 (1975). However, the pro-
cedure appears to be unacceptable under present law if notice and comment proce-
dures are otherwise required. See American College of Neuropsychopharmacology 
v. Weinberger, No. 75-1187 (D.D.C. July 3, 1975). 
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Internal Revenue Bulletin, would be accompanied by an invitation 
to the public to comment on the rule. 268 Comments would be re-
ceived for a substantial period of time, such as a minimum of sixty 
days. The rule would also include a concise statement of its basis 
and purpose, as is presently required for legislative rules.269 
The agency staff would then be required to evaluate the com-
ments received and publish its response to them. As a result of 
public reaction, the rule might be amended, repealed, or left intact, 
but in any event, the agency would be obligated to defend its rule 
by replying to the comments, as is presently required for conven-
tional legislative rulemaking. 270 The statute would set a deadline 
for the agency's reply, perhaps sixty days from the end of the com-
ment period. During the postadoption period, the rule would be in 
full force, unless the agency chose to give it a deferred effective date. 
This proposal has a number of advantages. First, it would per~ 
mit the issuance of nonlegislative rules without delay. This would 
be beneficial to both the agency and the public. It would minimize 
confusion and uncertainty and allow the agency's chosen interpre-
tation or policy to be applied immediately. Second, it would encour-
age the participation of the public by making it clear that the agency 
would be required to consider interested persons' comments and 
reply to them, and that a reviewing court would take the comments 
and replies into account. Third, it would supply a record that would 
facilitate judicial review. Fourth, it seems unlikely that this proce-
dure would deter the agency from adopting interpretive rules and 
policy statements. Finally, this approach seems a far better solution 
than an abolition of the exemption for nonlegislative rules coupled 
with reliance on the good cause exemption. If the rule is trivial or 
268. A good cause exemption similar to those presently contained in sections 553 
(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) of the Act should apply to the new procedure. Of course, 
no postadoption comments need be solicited if the agency employed the preadoption 
notice and comment procedure. One difficult issue is whether the postadoption pro-
cedure should apply to interpretive rules or policy statements adopted in adjudication. 
The Administrative Conference recently adopted a recommendation that rules 
adopted in adjudication be published in the Federal Register. ADMINISTRATIVE CON-
FERENCE OF TIIE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 76-2 (1976). However, inter-
pretive rules and policy statements adopted in adjudication probably should not be 
subjected to mandatory posteffective public commentary. The parties to the adjudica-
tion have already furnished some input on the subject. Although the public probably 
could contribute additional insights, given the present development of administrative 
law concepts, it seems premature to insist on rule-making procedures for rules 
adopted in adjudication. An introductory paragraph of Administrative Conference 
Recommendation 76-5 specifically excludes rules adopted in adjudication from post-
adoption procedures. See note 266 supra. 
269. See note 5 supra. 
270. See text at note 205 supra. 
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noncontroversial, nobody will comment on it, but if the rule is needed 
because of an emergency, the agency can adopt it immediately without 
fear that a court will disagree with its finding of emergency. 
There are, of course, objections to this proposal. The most im-
portant criticism is that postadoption public commentary is far less 
meaningful than preadoption commentary. According to this criti-
cism, once an agency has adopted a rule in final form, the thinking 
of its staff may have rigidified. Thus, the staff's reply to postadop-
tion commentary might be a mere articulation of an already 
hardened position rather than a principled response to suggested 
modifications of the rule. 
:Yhis objection is less persuasive than it might initially appear to 
be. As a practical matter, it frequently happens that a proposed rule 
has undergone extensive review by the staff before public notice is 
given in compliance with preadoption procedures. Often the minds 
of the staff are made up before the public is ever invited to participate. 
In such cases, the public's commentary is viewed more as an annoy-
ance than as a significant contribution. Nevertheless, it must be 
admitted that postadoption commentary is less likely to influence the 
final product than is preadoption commentary. However, if the staff 
acts in good faith, it will reconsider its position in light of postadoption 
comments; it must, after all, draft credible responses to them that 
may well be scrutinized by a reviewing court. 
A second criticism of a postadoption procedure is that it depends 
upon the agency's publishing the rule in the Federal Register or in 
some other generally available form. Although publication is al-
ready required by the AP A, 271 agency compliance with the provision 
is spotty272 and the courts do not strictly enforce it. 273 Moreover, 
a good many interpretations and policy statements are in the form 
of manuals or instructions to staff that need not be published but 
only made available to the public. 274 
This objection has some validity, but the problem of nonpubli-
271. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (D) (1970). 
272. See E. Tomlinson, supra note 35, at 34-41; Newman, Government and Ig-
norance-A Progress Report on Publication of Federal Regulations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 
929, 934-43 (1950). 
273. See, e.g., Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1975); Airport Comm. of Forsyth County v. CAB, 300 
F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1962); Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1976). In Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), the Court 
held that a legislative rule is ineffective without publication in the Federal Register. 
While refusing to follow the agency's interpretation because it was inconsistent with 
the congressional purpose, the court appeared willing to treat the rule as a validly 
adopted interpretive rule even though it had not been published. 
274. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (C) (1970). 
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cation seems solvable. If the agency knows that its interpretive rules 
and policy statements could be held invalid for want of public partici-
pation, and that participation can be triggered only by publication, 
the agencies will have to reconsider their publication practices. 
Similarly, to the extent that instructions to staff contain generally 
applicable policy statements and interpretations, 275 these should be 
extracted and published separately as rules. Here again, a little ju-
dicial enforcement would go a long way. 
Many agencies will, no doubt, voice a third objection, that the 
creation of postadoption procedures will increase their workload. 
Staff must read, collate, evaluate, and respond to the public's com-
ments, and they must adhere to a statutory time schedule in doing so. 
Of course, even under present law, the public can always petition 
for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule, 276 and agency re-
sponse to such petitions takes time. Still, a systematized form of post-
adoption public commentary will likely generate more comments 
than does the existing petition provision and agency costs will no 
doubt be increased by it. However, the increase will be far less than 
would occur if the present exemptions were simply repealed. 
Overall, the benefits to the public from postadoption commentary 
outweigh the modest additional costs that would be imposed on the 
agency. 
A fourth objection is that the proposal will fail to solve the def-
initional problem raised by section 4 of the AP A. There will con-
tinue to be uncertainty about whether a rule is legislative, so that 
preadoption procedure is required, or whether it is an interpretive 
rule or a policy statement, so that postadoption procedure is suffi-
cient. 277 The definitional problem can be greatly alleviated, how-
275. Since instructions to staff and manuals are now public information, see 
Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 795-
97 (6th Cir. 1972), the fact that they contain interpretive rules and policy statements 
of general applicability will come to light. Persons aggrieved by them could argue 
that they are invalid for lack of Federal Register publication and public participation. 
276. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (19-70). Indeed, it could be argued that postadoption 
procedures establish nothing more than is already provided in section 553. However, 
there is a vast difference between a right to petition the agency and an invitation 
by the agency for comments, together with an assurance that the agency will read 
and respond to the comments within a fixed period of time. 
277. Definitional problems exist on another level as well. Courts have deter-
mined that some agency behavior should not be treated as a rule at all. See, e.g., 
National Ornament & Elec. Light Christmas Assn. v. Consumer Prod. Safety 
Commn., 526 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1975) (program in which volunteer deputies would 
instruct retailers on how to test Christmas lights for defects, and report them to the 
Commission, and inventory the lights was held not to be a rule); Illinois Citizens 
Commn. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (speeches 
by individual agency members were not treated as rules). Furthermore, some staff 
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ever. For example, the statute could provide that if the agency 
made a good-faith error in characterizing a new rule, the court could 
treat the postadoption commentary procedure as an adequate substi-
tute for the usual preadoption procedures. Thus, the agency's failure 
to utilize preadoption procedures need not be grounds for declaring 
the rule invalid and requiring a new and probably fruitless cycle of 
rulemaking. It would often be better if the court could say to the 
agency: "You have erred. This is a legislative rule, not a policy 
statement or interpretive rule, but your error seems to have been 
in good faith. The postadoption procedures that you used were a 
close enough substitute for the usual preadoption procedures. Con-
sequently, your error was not prejudicial and the rule will be allowed 
to stand." The court would also have the option, of course, of or-
dering a new cycle of preadoption rule-making procedure, and it 
would clearly want to do so if the agency seemed to make it a prac-
tice to misuse postadoption procedures. 
In fact, a new statute might even disapprove the substantial im-
pact test entirely, causing the courts to return to the much clearer 
legal effect test. This amendment might adopt the legal effect stan-
dard, so that it would never be an abuse of discretion for the agency 
to dispense with preadoption procedures for rules that are labelled 
as interpretive or policy statements, regardless of their impact. Al-
though such an approach would clarify the law, it would do so at a 
significant cost, and thus it is not recommended. The courts should 
retain the power to impose additional preadoption procedural re-
quirements on agencies seeking to enact unusually significant non-
legislative rules. 
Finally, opponents of any proposal to impose procedural require-
ments on nonlegislative rulemaking might complain of unclear 
consequences for agency failure to follow the required procedures. 
Suppose the invalidly adopted rule reflects the best interpretation 
or policy, or even the only correct one. Would the agency be re-
quired to substitute an inferior interpretation for the proper one, or 
to exercise its discretion in a manner inconsistent with its well-con-
sidered policies? Would the court always have to remand to the 
agency for a new rule-making procedure, even though the result is 
a foregone conclusion? 
There is no simple answer to these questions and different 
courses of action would seem appropriate in different situations. 
Assume, for example, that an invalidly adopted rule represents a 
positions might be classified as not having been "adopted by the agency." See M, 
AsIMow, supra note 88, at 8S-88. 
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change in prior law or practice that might upset legitimate reliance 
interests or impose considerable individual hardship. Assume also 
that there would be little or no harm to the public in a holding that 
the new rule is invalid and the old one continues in effect. In this 
situation, the reviewing court could well find the new rule invalid 
and require the agency to comply with statutory procedures. The 
two immigration cases discussed in this article, Lewis-Mota v. Secre-
tary of Labor218 and Noel v. Chapman,219 are illustrations of such 
situations. Nothing prevents the court from requiring the agency to 
retain its prior law or practice until a change is effected with proper 
procedures. 280 
There might also be cases in which the courts should refuse to 
allow an invalidly adopted interpretive rule or policy statement to 
be considered in litigation. The agency would therefore lose the 
advantage of judicial deference customarily accorded its interpre-
tations or policies. 281 
Finally, consider the situation in which the new interpretation or 
policy is undoubtedly a correct one-perhaps the only correct one-
and its adoption is therefore inevitable. Assume further that it rep-
resents no change in prior law or policy and that no private reliance 
interests could be based upon a contrary position. In this situation, 
the court could easily decide to let the invalidly adopted rule or 
policy stand. The agency might have erred, but its error was not 
a prejudicial one, and it would be a waste of time and effort to re-
mand to the agency.282 A possible illustration is the press release 
involved in Airport Commission of Forsyth County v. CAB,283 where 
it would have been absurd to reverse the CAB's determination, 
which was so obviously correct, in order to start anew a process that 
could only yield the same result. 
All that can be said is that reviewing courts must decide on a 
case-by-case basis precisely how to deal with invalidly adopted inter-
278. See text at notes 114-19 supra. 
279. See text at notes 82-87 supra. 
280. See City of New York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 
Gardner v. Tarr, 341 F. Supp. 442 (D.D.C. 1972). 
281. A bill, which has been favorably reported by the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, contains a provision in respect to rules adopted without appropriate procedures 
that "no person shall be required to resort to or be adversely affected by such a rule, 
nor may such a rule be admitted into evidence or considered in any agency proceed-
ing or any judicial review of such proceeding .... " H.R. 12048, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1976). See H.R. Rep. 94-1014, pt. 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976). 
282. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 579 (1969); NLRB v. APW 
Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1963). 
283. See text at notes 63-64 supra. 
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pretations and policy statements. Just as courts have found a 
variety of ways to prevent retroactive changes in agency positions, 284 
so too can they compel the agency to adhere to an interpretation 
or a policy that the agency wants to change. In other situations, such 
a result would be absurd; the court could permit the change, with 
or without a remand for a new rule-making proceeding. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The courts have pursued inconsistent theories in evaluating 
claims by the public that preadoption procedures should have been 
employed in the adoption of interpretive rules and policy statements. 
Some of them have looked only to legal effects and labels; this 
achieves some predictability of result, but at the cost of rejecting 
well-founded claims that the public was wrongfully excluded from 
the agency's deliberative processes. Other courts have considered 
only the practical impact of the rule. This approach insures public 
participation in rulemaking but injects an element of unpredicta-
bility. 
Abolition of the present statutory exemption would not serve 
the interests of the public or the agency. Repeal of the exemption 
would have an adverse effect on the functioning of the federal 
government; its disadvantages would clearly outweigh its advan-
tages. Moreover, repeal would probably lead to overuse of the good 
cause exemptions, thereby inviting obstructionist litigants to abuse 
the system and possibly excluding the public to nearly the same de-
gree as it is presently excluded. It would be far better to create 
a new system for postadoption comment and mandatory agency 
responses. Such a provision would realize most of the benefits of 
preadoption commentary without imposing severe costs and delays 
and possibly driving much rulemaking underground. As part of a 
needed reform of the rule-making provisions of the AP A, such a 
system deserves sympathetic consideration by Congress. 
284. See text at notes 244-53 supra. 
